The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice by Robinson, Paul H. et al.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
11-2007 
The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice 
Paul H. Robinson 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Robert O. Kurzban 
University of Pennsylvania, Department of Psychology 
Owen D. Jones 
Vanderbilt University Law School & Department of Biological Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Behavior and Ethology Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Evolution Commons, Law and 
Psychology Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Robinson, Paul H.; Kurzban, Robert O.; and Jones, Owen D., "The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice" 
(2007). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 129. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/129 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
  
 
1633 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 
________________________________________________________________________ 
VOLUME 60 NOVEMBER 2007 NUMBER 6 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The Origins of 
Shared Intuitions of Justice 
 
Paul H. Robinson,* Robert Kurzban,** and Owen D. Jones*** 
I.  THE PUZZLE: SHARED INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE ..................1634 
II.  AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION......................................1639 
A. The Expression of Genes .........................................1639 
1. Genetic Influences versus Genetic  
Determinism ................................................1640 
2. The Genetic Code as a Recipe for  
Development ................................................1641 
B. Evolution as a Process of Solving Survival  
Problems .................................................................1643 
C. The Evolution of General Moral and Proto-Legal 
Sentiments ..............................................................1644 
D. The Evolution of Intuitions of Justice ....................1646 
1. Human Sociality and the Predisposition  
to Acquire Shared Intuitions of Justice ......1646 
2. Intuitions of Justice as Generating  
Benefits for Individuals...............................1649 
III. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY  
EXPLANATION .....................................................................1654 
 
 * Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The authors are indebted 
to Michael Orchowski, Alex Shaw, Peter DeScioli, Lindsay Suttenberg, Martha K. Presley, Shang 
Cao, and Susan Eisenberg for invaluable research assistance. 
 ** Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania. 
 *** Professor of Law & Professor of Biological Sciences, Vanderbilt University; Co-Director, 
Network on Decision Making, MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project. 
  
1634 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:6:1633 
A. Animal Studies Evidence........................................1654 
B. Brain Science Evidence...........................................1659 
C. Child Development Evidence ..................................1664 
1. Predictable Stages of Development.............1664 
2. Making Subtle and Complex Judgments  
at an Early Age............................................1666 
a. Distinguishing Moral, Conventional, 
and Prudential Rules .......................1667 
b. Judging the Relative Seriousness of 
Wrongful Conduct.............................1669 
c. Judging Blameworthiness with  
Factors beyond Offense Seriousness .1671 
3. Cross-Cultural Developmental Studies ......1674 
D. Summary of Evidence .............................................1675 
IV.  ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: GENERAL SOCIAL  
LEARNING AND EFFICIENT NORMS .....................................1677 
A. Spontaneous Social Learning.................................1678 
1. Preferring Group Interests Over  
Individual Interests.....................................1678 
2. Complexity of Determining Efficient  
Norms as Beyond Individual Capacity .......1679 
B. Accumulated Social Learning ................................1681 
1. Absence of Variation in Intuitions of  
Justice Among Groups Despite Large 
Differences in Situation and Culture..........1682 
2. Inconsistency with Developmental Data ....1683 
3. Intuitional Knowledge as Having Distinct 
Characteristics from Learned Knowledge ..1684 
4. Difficulties in Teaching Inarticulable 
Lessons ........................................................1685 
CONCLUSION..................................................................................1687 
 
I. THE PUZZLE: SHARED INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE 
The role of justice in assigning criminal liability and 
punishment has been a matter of long-standing debate. A standard 
argument against a desert distributive principle—that is, against 
distributing punishment according to an offender’s blameworthiness—
has been that such a concept of “desert” is simply too vague and the 
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subject of too much disagreement to operationalize.1 There may be 
some truth to these complaints when applied to a philosophical notion 
of desert, which has been the traditional basis of the desert school.2 
But more recently, a utilitarian-based theory of desert has 
urged reliance on an empirical notion of desert, drawn from the 
community’s shared intuitions of justice rather than from the 
reasoned concepts of moral philosophy.3 The same objections about 
vagueness and lack of agreement are lodged against this empirical 
notion of desert. People’s intuitions of justice, it is claimed, are simply 
too vague to be relied on and, in any case, there is too much 
disagreement about what constitutes deserved punishment to 
construct a workable criminal justice system. It is the common wisdom 
that little agreement exists among people’s intuitions of justice: 
[E]ven assuming retribution in distribution is appropriate, there is a classic 
epistemological problem. How do we know how much censure, or “deserved 
punishment,” a particular wrongdoer absolutely deserves? God may know, but as 
countless sentencing exercises have shown, peoples’ intuitions about individual cases 
vary widely.4 
There is . . . reason to doubt that anything like a consensus exists on the seriousness of 
criminal conduct. While there may be some agreement on relative levels of harm, there 
appears to be great variation in perceptions of the absolute magnitude of harm 
represented by various criminal acts, and in either the relative or absolute level of 
culpability represented by various criminal actors.5 
 
 1. Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, 
and Empirical 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (on file with authors). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 
(1997). 
 4. Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1233, 1263 (2005). 
 5. John Monahan, The Case for Prediction in the Modified Desert Model of Criminal 
Sentencing, 5 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 103, 105 (1982). Other authors have made similar 
arguments: 
[Desert theorists argue that] we can work out one single, linear ordering of crimes, 
from least to most “serious.” Yet that scarcely seems a credible assumption. Try, for 
instance, to rank the following crimes in order of their “seriousness”: attempted 
residential burglary, trading stock on inside information, negligent vehicular 
homicide, bribing a mine-safety inspector, possessing an ounce of cocaine, and burning 
a cross on the lawn of black newcomers to a previously all-white neighborhood. To 
view this motley assortment along a single dimension of “seriousness” would seem no 
less difficult than to perceive the inner logic behind the apocryphal Chinese 
encyclopedist of Jorge Luis Borges’s imagination. 
David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1638-39 (1992). 
Similarly, Ernest van den Haag argues: 
[Desert theorists moreover appear] to believe that the comparative seriousness of 
crimes can be determined in all cases. Not so. Comparative seriousness can be 
determined only for some crimes, and it does not fully determine the comparative 
punishment deserved. If rape is a crime and murder is a crime, rape-murder must be 
more serious than either. Does rape-murder deserve the sum of the punishments 
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In this respect, the common wisdom is simply wrong. Part of 
the confusion here arises from the failure to distinguish two distinct 
judgments: setting the endpoint of the punishment continuum and, 
once that endpoint has been set, ordinally ranking all cases along that 
continuum. The first of these judgments is not really a distributive 
judgment, at least in the sense that it is not part of the adjudication 
process. Rather, every society must decide what punishment it will 
allow for its most egregious case, be it the death penalty or life 
imprisonment or fifteen years. Once that endpoint is set, the challenge 
for the adjudication system is to determine whom to punish and how 
much punishment to impose. The process of distributing punishment 
requires only an ordinal ranking of offenders according to their 
blameworthiness. The result is a specific amount of punishment, but 
that amount of punishment is not selected because there is some 
intrinsic connection between that offense and that amount of 
punishment. Rather, it is selected because, given the large number of 
cases with distinguishable blameworthiness and the limited range of 
punishment, that specific amount of punishment is required to set the 
offender in his appropriate ordinal rank according to his relative 
blameworthiness. If the punishment continuum endpoint is changed, 
the appropriate punishment for each offender changes accordingly.6 
A wide variety of empirical studies indicate that people broadly 
share intuitions that serious wrongdoing should be punished and also 
share intuitions about the relative blameworthiness of different 
transgressions.7 In some studies, subjects were asked to put offenses 
or offense scenarios into one of a set of predetermined categories; in 
another kind of study, subjects were asked to rank-order offenses or 
offense scenarios; in a third kind of study, subjects were asked to 
assign numerical values to each of a number of offenses or offense 
scenarios.8 
The results in all of these studies are consistent. First, subjects 
displayed a good deal of nuance in the judgments they made.9 Small 
 
meted out for rape and for murder? More? Less? Even when crimes are nearly 
homogeneous, assigning seriousness is arbitrary: Is rape more serious than assault 
with a deadly weapon? Is burglary more serious than fraud when fraud does more 
harm? What about mishandling toxic waste? Ordinal determinations of seriousness 
become altogether arbitrary when the seriousness of heterogeneous crimes must be 
compared. 
Ernest van den Haag, Punishment: Desert and Crime Control, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1254 
(1987). 
 6. Robinson, supra note 1 (manuscript at 7-8). 
 7. For a general discussion of these matters, see Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, 
Concordance & Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1854-55 (2007). 
 8. Id. at 1837-40. 
 9. Id. at 1846. 
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changes in facts produced large and predictable changes in 
punishment. Second, subjects indicated an interest in imposing 
punishment for serious wrongdoing.10 Finally, subjects indicated 
considerable agreement about the relative amount of punishment that 
different offenders deserved.11 Indeed, the ordinal ranking of cases 
generally is consistent across demographic categories, including 
different cultural groups, as evidenced in cross-cultural studies that 
replicated domestic studies.12 Typical of the conclusions in these 
studies, and according to Graeme Newman,“it is apparent that there 
was considerable agreement as to the amount of punishment 
appropriate to each act,”13 and looking at relative rankings indicates 
“general agreement in ranks across all countries.”14 
The striking extent of the agreement on intuitions of justice is 
illustrated in a recent study that asked subjects to rank-order twenty-
four crime scenario descriptions according to the amount of 
punishment deserved.15 Most researchers would consider this a quite 
demanding task, perhaps asking for more concentration and effort 
than most subjects are willing or able to provide. Yet the study’s 
authors found that their subjects had little difficulty performing the 
task. Moreover, the task was also quite complex, requiring subjects to 
compare the deserved punishment for each scenario to the deserved 
punishment for each of the other twenty-three scenarios. Nonetheless, 
subjects displayed an astounding level of agreement in the ordinal 
ranking of the scenarios. 
A statistical measure of concordance is found in Kendall’s 
coefficient of concordance (“Kendall’s W”), in which 1.0 indicates 
perfect agreement and 0.0 indicates no agreement. In the study just 
described, the Kendall’s W was 0.95 (with p < .001).16 This is a striking 
level of agreement. One might expect a similarly high Kendall’s W if 
subjects were asked to judge the relative brightness of different 
 
 10. Id. at 1842-53. 
 11. Id. at 1854-65. 
 12. Id. 
 13. GRAEME NEWMAN, COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE: PERCEPTION AND LAW IN SIX CULTURES 140 
(1976). 
 14. Id. at 141-43 (providing a table listing data by country); see also id. at 135-48 
(discussing variability deriving from differences in views regarding how particular acts should be 
controlled or punished). People from different cultures might share the intuition that an act is 
wrong, and even a view on each act’s relative seriousness, yet still differ in how punishment 
should be imposed, whether by the state, family, or some other source. This discussion highlights 
the importance of assessing intuitions regarding seriousness as distinct from preferred 
punishments meted out by the state. While the former might be correlated strongly with the 
latter in some contexts, it will be less so in others. 
 15. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 7, at 1867-74. 
 16. Id. 
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groupings of spots, for example.17 In the context of more subjective or 
complex comparisons, such as asking travel magazine readers to rank 
the attractiveness of eight different destinations, a Kendall’s W of 0.52 
is typical.18 When asking economists to rank the top twenty economics 
journals according to quality, one gets a Kendall’s W of 0.095.19 
How can it be that when asking people to perform a 
comparative task as complex and subjective as assessing the relative 
blameworthiness of twenty-four different offenders, their level of 
concurrence matches that for much more simple and objective 
comparative tasks? That is the puzzle that this Article explores. 
One possible explanation is the effect of evolutionary processes, 
which can generate cognitive and behavioral predispositions that help 
individuals solve commonly encountered problems in ancestral 
environments. Part II explains how these processes might underlie the 
phenomenon of shared intuitions of justice. Part III examines evidence 
from animal behavior studies, brain science, and child development 
studies that are consistent with the evolutionary explanation. Part IV 
considers an alternative explanation: that shared intuitions of justice 
might arise through general social learning because particular 
intuitions of justice provide efficient norms for group functioning. 
However, the social learning explanation has a variety of difficulties. 
To note just one, consider the wide diversity in the life experiences of 
individuals, and in the social context and structure of groups. Given 
this, one would expect a social learning process to produce far more 
than the observed variations in intuitions of justice. On present 
evidence, we conclude, the evolutionary explanation of shared 
intuitions of justice seems more plausible than a universal social 
learning explanation. 
 
 17. See Charles M.M. de Weert & Noud A.W.H. van Kruysbergen, Assimilation: Central and 
Peripheral Effects, 26 PERCEPTION 1217, 1219-24 (1997) (obtaining a Kendall’s W of 0.95 when 
subjects compared brightness). 
 18. Baruch Fischhoff et al., Travel Risks in a Time of Terror: Judgments and Choices, 24 
RISK ANALYSIS 1301 (2004). 
 19. The analysis of complex comparisons of journal rankings among economists reveals a 
relatively low Kendall’s W: 
These results unveil significant diversity in the journal quality perceptions 
among groups of economists despite the fact that our sample focused on [American 
Economic Association] members. To test the robustness of this claim, using Kendall’s 
W we examined the correlation in journal quality perceptions between any two 
randomly selected economists in our sample. We found Kendall’s W for the top ten 
journals in our rankings to be 0.396, which demonstrates a relatively low level of 
agreement among economists. Once we extended this exercise to the top 20 journals in 
our rankings, Kendall’s W dropped to only 0.095. 
Kostas Axarloglou & Vasilis Theoharakis, Diversity in Economics: An Analysis of Journal 
Quality Perceptions, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1402, 1421 (2003). 
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II. AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION 
Part I paints a striking picture of human intuitions of justice: 
across demographics, even across cultures, humans share nuanced 
intuitions (1) about what constitutes serious wrongdoing, (2) that 
serious wrongdoing should be punished, and (3) about the relative 
blameworthiness of offenders. How can matters of such nuance and 
complexity show this degree of agreement despite dramatic differences 
in individuals’ social and cultural context and upbringing? How can it 
be that persons of dramatically different religious, economic, and 
educational backgrounds and of different races, ages, and genders 
share the same intuitions of justice? We suggest that one explanation 
for this homogeneity of human intuitions of justice derives from that 
which all humans share by virtue of being human: their unique 
evolutionary history and resulting human nature.20 
In this Part, we first briefly offer a primer for the role of genes 
in the development of an individual’s traits; we then describe how 
evolutionary processes, most notably natural selection, operate to 
preserve both anatomical and behavioral traits that helped to solve 
challenges regularly encountered by ancestors over evolutionary time. 
We then explain how the process of solving those challenges can lead 
to a variety of common psychological preferences in humans, including 
some general moral preferences. And we subsequently discuss how, 
more specifically, those evolutionary processes can result in shared 
intuitions of justice in the context of punishments for wrongdoing. 
A. The Expression of Genes 
It is relatively uncontroversial that evolutionary processes, 
genes, and environments all influence human predispositions and 
resultant behaviors. But precisely how those influences interact, on 
which predispositions and behaviors, and with what consequences and 
implications, represent important questions under continuing 
investigation. Even what is known is often misunderstood. 
 
 20. In this, we extend work that addresses the intersections of law and evolutionary 
processes. See, e.g., THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (Roger D. Masters 
& Margaret Gruter eds., 1992); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and 
Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005); Owen D. Jones, Proprioception, Non-
Law, and Biolegal History, 53 FLA. L. REV. 831 (2001); Michael T. McGuire, Moralistic 
Aggression, Processing Mechanisms, and the Brain: The Biological Foundations of the Sense of 
Justice, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE, supra at 31, 44 (arguing that there is likely “a species-
characteristic biological basis for assessing events as just or unjust”); Society for Evolutionary 
Analysis in Law (SEAL), Owen D. Jones, Useful Sources: Biology, Evolution, and Law, 
http://www.sealsite.org (located under “Scholarly Resources” tab) (last visited Oct. 7, 2007). 
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Consequently, we start with a brief primer on the general principles 
by which evolutionary processes, genes, and environments can affect 
behaviors, and how they cannot.21 
1. Genetic Influences versus Genetic Determinism 
Genetic explanations do not imply that a trait is “hard wired” 
or “inflexible.” All human traits exist because of the interaction 
between an individual’s set of genes—a subset of all possible human 
genes—and the unique combination of environmental conditions a 
person encounters while developing.22 The effect of any given gene 
depends on many factors, such as the presence or absence of other 
genes, the body’s internal environment (e.g., cells), the individual’s 
external environment, and so forth.23 Gene expression, therefore, is 
extremely complex and is always influenced by the (broadly construed) 
environment the gene encounters. 
It is clear that changing genes or changing environments 
changes traits, whether physical or psychological. And there is 
consequently widespread consensus that environmental determinism 
and genetic determinism are both incorrect.24 Human minds are 
neither “blank slate[s]” to be written on by experience,25 nor 
completely the product of genetics. They are, rather, the products of 
complex interactions between genes and their developmental 
environments, all under the relentless influence of evolutionary 
pressures that have favored some patterns of interactions over 
others.26 
 
 21. Key works in evolutionary biology generally include DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA, 
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (3d ed. 1998) and MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION (3d ed. 2004). Useful works 
with behavioral emphases include JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY 
APPROACH (8th ed. 2005); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (30th anniversary ed. 2006); 
and TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN 
NATURE (2001). Primers written explicitly for legal thinkers also appear in Jones & Goldsmith, 
supra note 20, at 426-31 and Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and 
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1127-57 (1997). 
 22. See, e.g., MARY JANE WEST-EBERHARD, DEVELOPMENTAL PLASTICITY AND EVOLUTION 
(2003). 
 23. Id. 
 24. JEFFREY L. ELMAN ET AL., RETHINKING INNATENESS: A CONNECTIONIST PERSPECTIVE ON 
DEVELOPMENT (1996); STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN 
NATURE 76, 113 (2002); MATT RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE: GENES, EXPERIENCE, AND WHAT 
MAKES US HUMAN (2003); Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 485-88. 
 25. This still-common view was given powerful voice by John Locke. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, 
AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 121 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., Encyclopaedia 
Britannica 1952) (1690). 
 26. PINKER, supra note 24. 
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2. The Genetic Code as a Recipe for Development 
Although a “blueprint” provides a tempting metaphor for the 
genetic code, a better metaphor is a “recipe.”27 Without the presence of 
the appropriate environment (a cook and kitchen), genes (recipes) 
have no important causal consequences. In the realm of biological 
development, the dynamic interplay between genes and environment 
is exceedingly complex.28 Biochemical interactions at the cellular level 
and the building of connections in the brain are vastly intricate and 
still little understood. However, this complexity does not imply that no 
prediction can be made about an individual’s development, nor does it 
imply that development is so complex as to be essentially random. 
Rather, even psychological traits that are “learned,” such as language, 
are brought about by a predictable interaction between an individual’s 
genes and the environment in which the individual develops.29 
The genes that humans share cause each person’s structures to 
be built in a predictable and systematic way. Consider the human 
visual system. Every human visual system receives different stimuli 
because every baby is born into a unique perceptual world with 
different objects (e.g., people and animals). However, the mature 
visual system for all normally developed adults is essentially the 
same. When a trait such as this emerges across a wide range of 
environments, it is said to be “reliably developing.” Human genes 
ensure that even these complex elements of the body are 
“reincarnated” each generation.30 Because the developmental process 
for human psychological traits is complex, it is easier to see such trait 
“reincarnation” in physical traits. Consider Gray’s Anatomy.31 A book 
about “the human body” is possible only because all humans develop 
in the same reliable, systematic fashion, despite the obvious 
complexities of that process. And, important to our purposes here, 
 
 27. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER: WHY THE EVIDENCE OF EVOLUTION 
REVEALS A UNIVERSE WITHOUT A DESIGN 52 (W.W. Norton & Co. reissue ed. 1996) (“The genes, 
as we shall see, are more like a recipe than like a blueprint . . . .”). 
 28. For an overview of recent research in the field of evolutionary development, see SEAN B. 
CARROLL, ENDLESS FORMS MOST BEAUTIFUL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVO DEVO AND THE MAKING 
OF THE ANIMAL KINGDOM (2005). 
 29. John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE 
ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 19, 83-84 
(Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992). For this reason, attempting to dichotomize important 
human traits as only culturally or genetically influenced is misguided. 
 30. John Tooby et al., The Second Law of Thermodynamics is the First Law of Psychology, 
129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 858, 863-64 (2003). 
 31. HENRY GRAY, GRAY’S ANATOMY: THE ANATOMICAL BASIS OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY 
(Susan Standring ed., Elsevier Churchill Livingstone 39th ed. 2005) (1858). 
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even psychological traits, such as the capacity to learn a language, 
follow a similar pattern. 
Of course, development is not necessarily uniform across all 
individuals. In the context of language learning, the developing child 
has a special capacity to acquire the ability to understand and produce 
language that the child hears spoken.32 But all normal humans have 
this special language-acquisition mechanism. Other species do not. A 
cat exposed to the same linguistic environment learns to understand 
few words, if any. We will argue below that, just as they do with 
language, people have a specific ability to acquire intuitions of justice. 
The intuitions that result from this acquisition mechanism are not 
“innate” in a naïve sense of the term, such as “present at birth.” 
Instead, we argue that there exists a predisposition by which people 
acquire these intuitions over the course of development both as a child 
and as an adult. 
Which language a child acquires depends on the linguistic 
environment, but the genes that allow language acquisition play a role 
as important as the presence of linguistic sounds.33 All normally 
developing humans in Topeka acquire the syntax and vocabulary of 
English, while those in Tokyo learn Japanese. In this instance, the 
environmental variation leads to differences in the developed adult. In 
short, the effect of experience varies from one trait to another, with 
some traits being relatively constant across environments (vision) and 
others being different across environments (language). 
The reason for the differential effect of environment can be 
traced back to the logic of evolved adaptations (which we describe in 
the next section). The process of evolution resulted in the selection of a 
developmental process, which results in the development of the visual 
system in such a way that it does not depend on the details of the 
specific stimuli that are in one’s visual world because, by virtue of the 
universal principles of optics, the same solution to vision applies in 
every setting. This is not the case for language, however, as the most 
useful language to learn depends on the language others around you 
are speaking. For this reason, evolutionary processes left specific 
elements of language acquisition to vary across groups.34 
 
 32. See NOAM CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND USE 3 
(1986). 
 33. See Gary F. Marcus & Simon E. Fisher, FOXP2 in Focus: What Can Genes Tell Us about 
Speech and Language?, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 257 (2003). 
 34. STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE 240-43 
(1994). 
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B. Evolution as a Process of Solving Survival Problems 
Most of the significant genes that distinguish us as “human” 
are ones that were selected over the course of the last 250,000 
generations because their effects led to reproductive success.35 More 
specifically, current human genes are in large measure the ones that 
caused individuals to survive and reproduce better, on average, than 
did alternative genes. Evolution by natural selection, therefore, is the 
origin of all complex, functional human traits, whether physical or 
psychological.36 The success of one gene over another is generally the 
result of its contribution to solving problems that humans faced, such 
as finding nutritious food, choosing good mates, raising a family, 
avoiding predation, and so forth. Genes that contributed to success in 
confronting these problems were selected (meaning they tended to 
appear in increasingly large percentages in successive generations). 
Thus, the traits these genes produced can be understood as having 
functions, or means by which these problems were solved. 
Traits are typically specific in function. That is, to guide the 
organism toward positive reproductive outcomes, specific traits are 
needed to solve different problems. This is evident in physical organ 
systems, for example, as the heart is good at pumping blood but bad at 
filtering it for toxins, while the reverse is true for the liver. And the 
human visual system is good at using light to learn about what is out 
in the world, but it is not well equipped to acquire language. 
Specificity of function is the hallmark of natural selection because 
mechanisms such as the heart and the visual system tend to work best 
when they help to solve a narrow task, in the same way that tools 
work best when they are designed for one particular job. The same 
holds for many psychological traits. In sum, much of human 
psychology consists of evolved, reliably developing traits that have 
 
 35. This estimate is commonly used. See, e.g., Colm O’hUigin et al., The Implications of 
Intergenic Polymorphism for Major Histocompatibility Complex Evolution, 156 GENETICS 867, 
873 (2000). It corresponds to a period of roughly five million years, the estimated time since 
human and chimpanzee ancestors diverged. Feng-Chi Chen & Wen-Hsiung Li, Genomic 
Divergences Between Humans and Other Hominoids and the Effective Population Size of the 
Common Ancestor of Humans and Chimpanzees, 68 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 444, 444 (2001). 
 36. Obviously, there is more to this issue than can be covered here. Changes in gene 
frequencies in a population can occur as the result of multiple processes, including genetic drift 
and natural selection. See, e.g., DAWKINS, supra note 21. However, natural selection is commonly 
considered the one process that can generate both increases in complexity and a close fit between 
the features of an organism and its environment. “Natural selection” refers to the result of three 
conditions: a) variation, b) heritability, and c) differential reproduction of individuals as a 
function of their heritable variations. The process was famously identified and described in 
CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (Penguin Classics 
ed. 1985) (1859). 
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functions associated with the adaptive problems faced by our 
ancestors. Modern human minds contain psychological adaptations 
that successfully solved our ancestors’ adaptive problems.37 
C. The Evolution of General Moral and Proto-Legal Sentiments 
No one yet knows the full suite of psychological adaptations 
that human minds share. And given the complexity of the interactions 
between genes and culture, it is often unclear what can be said with 
confidence about how the human brain works. Yet in order to bridge 
from the general notion of evolved psychological adaptations to our 
specific suggestion that shared intuitions of justice reflect evolved 
adaptations, we need to lay a brief foundation for the idea that 
preferences—and indeed loosely “moral” sentiments—can evolve. 
Fortunately, there is ample reason, at both theoretical and empirical 
levels, to believe that human minds share a wide variety of 
preferences that range from the hedonic to the moral. 
Like most evolved human capacities, the psychological 
adaptations that steer humans through the complex social world have 
functions that led to reproductive success in the past. The function 
and concurrent reproductive advantages conferred by some human 
social adaptations are relatively obvious. Few could doubt that our 
species-typical preferences to sleep at night (on average) rather than 
during the day, to provision our own children over the children of 
other people, or to seek pleasure in sexual activity with others of our 
own rather than another species, reflect complex cognitive processes 
that in turn reflect evolutionary adaptations as well as the cultural 
overlays that may adjust the contexts and patterns in which we do so. 
The evolutionary logic is clear. And other species behave similarly, 
given the physical and behavioral niches that they have evolved to 
exploit.38 
The conclusion from the foregoing is that complex functional 
human psychological and behavioral traits are the results of 
adaptation through natural selection. These include not only traits 
relevant to mating and parenting and kinship, but also traits relating 
to the particular challenges of group living, which include aggression, 
competition, cooperation, deception, and moral sentiments enabling 
the evaluation of good and bad behaviors.39 Previous work has 
 
 37. John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Past Explains The Present: Emotional Adaptations 
and the Structure of Ancestral Environments, 11 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 375 (1990). 
 38. See generally GOLDSMITH & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 21; RIDLEY, supra note 21. 
 39. See generally FRANS B.M. DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG 
IN HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS (1996); THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (David 
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suggested that these preferences resulted in proto-legal systems of 
social primate interaction.40 
Consider the sentiments leading to judgments and, later, laws 
surrounding incest. Because of the detrimental effects of inbreeding, 
evolution appears to have selected for genes that cause organisms to 
develop behavioral systems that lead them away from mating with 
close genetic relatives.41 In humans, this manifests itself as disgust 
and, perhaps concomitantly, a shared sense that committing incest is 
wrong. 
The intuition has been shown through experimentation not to 
derive from logical rationales. Experimental subjects insist on the 
wrongfulness of incest, even if they are unable to articulate principled 
reasons for why incestuous relationships are wrong.42 Incest-avoiding 
mechanisms serve their evolutionary function without awareness of 
this function on the part of the individual organism.43 Such an 
intuition is highly adaptive: people who had this intuition, in contrast 
to those not having it, enjoyed greater long-term reproductive success, 
leaving more offspring who likewise successfully reproduced.44 This 
was accomplished by directing the individual away from inbreeding 
and its concurrent genetic costs. Incest provides a clear example of 
 
M. Buss ed., 2005); INVESTIGATING THE BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN MORALITY (James 
P. Hurd ed., 1996); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY 
PSYCHOLOGY (1994); Dennis Krebs, The Evolution of Morality, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra, at 747, 768 (“The mechanisms that give rise to morality are 
biological adaptations . . . .”). 
 40. See, e.g., OSTRACISM: A SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON (Margaret Gruter & 
Roger D. Masters eds., 1986). 
 41. See 2 EDVARD WESTERMARCK, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE 218-39 (5th ed. 1971) 
(1891) (arguing that natural selection eliminated injurious inbreeding tendencies); Irene Bevc & 
Irwin Silverman, Early Proximity and Intimacy Between Siblings and Incestuous Behavior: A 
Test of the Westermarck Theory, 14 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 171 (1993). 
 42. See, e.g., Debra Lieberman et al., Does Morality Have a Biological Basis?: An Empirical 
Test of the Factors Governing Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest, 270 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 
819 (2003); see also Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social 
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001); Jonathan Haidt & 
Matthew Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Liberals and Conservatives, 31 
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 191 (2001). This insistence applies even to cases in which, for example, 
the consummated sex act is between adult siblings, fully consensual, one time, and incapable of 
leading to pregnancy. Id. at 197, 213-14. 
 43. Neither a conscious motive to avoid deleterious inbreeding nor an ability to detect the 
degree of genetic relatedness is necessary. Even the inclination in many animals to leave their 
natal group upon reaching sexual maturity can serve this function. See, e.g., T.H. Clutton-Brock, 
Female Transfer and Inbreeding Avoidance in Social Mammals, 337 NATURE 70, 70 (1989). In 
humans, as in many species, for example, natural selection appears to have favored a 
predisposition against mating with those who were co-resident opposite-sex siblings during 
childhood—which has historically been a reliable proxy for close genetic relatedness. Lieberman 
et al., supra note 42, at 825. 
 44. 2 WESTERMARCK, supra note 41, at 220, 236-39, 
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how natural selection can favor the evolution of intuitions about 
wrongdoing whose particular functions are relevant to reproductive 
success. 
D. The Evolution of Intuitions of Justice 
Given the influence of genes, environments, and evolutionary 
processes on human problem-solving through evolved behavioral 
predispositions—including moral ones—it is a small but significant 
logical step to suggest that shared intuitions of justice, specific to 
punishments for transgressions of varying seriousness, also reflect our 
common evolutionary history. We argue below that human sociality 
has laid the foundation for an evolved predisposition to acquire shared 
intuitions of justice and that such intuitions benefit the individuals 
bearing them. Further, we argue there is reason to believe that 
evolution has in particular contributed to intuitions that physical 
harm, the taking of property, and cheating in exchanges are matters 
for particular attention and condemnation.45 
1. Human Sociality and the Predisposition to Acquire Shared 
Intuitions of Justice 
The predisposition to acquire human intuitions of justice likely 
arose from the deeply and innately social nature of the human species. 
Humans have been described as “ultrasocial” by anthropologists 
because of the many ways in which humans interact with one another, 
particularly in the context of cooperation between individuals and 
within groups.46 Group cooperation is relatively uncommon in the 
biological world—though there are exceptions, such as certain group-
living insects—and captures the attention of biologists because 
evolution, broadly, tends to favor genes that lead to selfish behavior. 
Humans, however, behave altruistically in many contexts: family 
relations, friendships, and within-group cooperation. How does such 
 
 45. Recently, Marc Hauser suggested how evolution could have led to the human capacity 
for morality. Though similar in locating the origins of justice in the theory of evolution by natural 
selection, and in using language as an analogy to motivate the analysis, our treatment differs in 
that it focuses on the advantages conferred to individuals in having particular intuitions 
regarding punishment for wrongful acts. Hauser links the intuition that wrongdoing be punished 
to intuitions about fairness. MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE DESIGNED OUR 
UNIVERSAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG 108-09 (2006) (“We can safely assume that these 
intuitions evolved prior to or during our life as hunter-gatherers . . . . In such small-scale 
societies, fairness was most likely an effective proxy for judging punishable acts.”). 
 46. Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Human Ultrasociality, in 
INDOCTRINABILITY, IDEOLOGY, AND WARFARE: EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 71, 71-72 (Irenäus 
Eibl-Eibesfeldt & Frank Kemp Salter eds., 1998). 
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extensive cooperation come to pass? The evolution of cooperation in 
humans and other species is the subject of a large theoretical and 
empirical literature in evolutionary biology,47 and the general outline 
is relevant to our argument. 
Both theoretical and empirical scholarship demonstrates that 
cooperation can evolve through several independent but overlapping 
processes.48 The one most relevant for our immediate purpose 
concerns the mutually beneficial effects of reciprocity: if you share 
with me today in exchange for my sharing with you yesterday, we are 
both better off than if neither of us shares. In social animals, 
reciprocity can involve such things as alerting other group members 
when food has been discovered, sharing food over time, and supporting 
a comrade in action against others. 
But underlying this rosy picture is a darker shadow. While it is 
evident that reciprocators can outperform loners, a cheater (or 
defector) could theoretically outperform both if he were able to take 
benefits regularly without repaying them. Consequently, an 
evolutionary arms race ensues in social animals between various 
predispositions toward cooperation and exploitation. In the end, the 
most successful cooperators are not those who always cooperate, but 
those who cooperate selectively with other cooperators, thus 
discriminating (passively or aggressively) against those who are not 
reliable partners in cooperative endeavors.49 Put another way, 
effective cooperation requires rewarding good behavior and punishing 
(or at least failing to reward) bad behavior. 
 
 47. That literature suggests that several causal processes are simultaneously at work. One, 
known as mutualism, reflects the fact that two working together can sometimes gain more than 
the sum of their actions, if they had acted alone. A second, known as kin selection, reflects the 
extent to which cooperatively furthering the reproductive success of kin increases the prevalence 
of any heritable predisposition to do so, since many kin will also carry the genes that contribute 
to that predisposition. A third, known as reciprocal altruism, reflects the fact that heritable 
predispositions to cooperate over time can yield mutual benefits, even between unrelated 
cooperators. On the extent to which these processes may be supplemented by other processes, see 
Herbert Gintis, Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality, 206 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 169 
(2000). 
 There is debate surrounding why humans evolved to be the extremely social animals that 
they are. For purposes of the current discussion, we remain agnostic on this debate and simply 
assume that humans are social creatures, have been for many generations, and have many traits 
that are adapted for social life. See, e.g., Leda Cosmides, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has 
Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason?, 31 COG. 187, 187-97 (1989); Tooby & Cosmides, 
supra note 29, at 19, 20; Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. 
BIOLOGY 35, 35-39 (1971). On the possible origins of social exchange in humans, and the inverse 
relationship between social hierarchy and social exchange, see CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, HIERARCHY 
IN THE FOREST: THE EVOLUTION OF EGALITARIAN BEHAVIOR 197, 197-99, 213 (1999). 
 48. See generally LEE ALAN DUGATKIN, COOPERATION AMONG ANIMALS: AN EVOLUTIONARY 
PERSPECTIVE (1997). 
 49. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
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For reciprocal altruism to work, though, one must be able to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of various kinds of things (such as 
different objects, acts, and information) and evaluate others’ valuation 
of those objects. One also must be able to discern unfairness, such as 
an inequitable distribution of resources or a violation of reciprocity. 
Furthermore, one must be able to recognize individuals and remember 
recent interactions with them, so as to discriminate in the future in 
favor of some and against others.50 These are precisely the features 
that we tend to observe in the most highly social animals.51 
Those features are also, we argue, precisely those that likely 
underlie the functional advantage of the specific learning capacity in 
humans for acquiring shared intuitions of justice. Humans have a 
universal and uniquely nuanced propensity for engaging in social 
exchange.52 Indeed, gains from social exchange form the basis of the 
modern economy and infiltrate nearly every aspect of our lives,53 both 
in formal markets and in personal relationships. The psychology that 
underpins exchange requires deep intuitions and complex 
computational capacities to operate. 
In particular, one critical capacity for successful social 
exchange is the intuition that one should punish individuals who 
injure others or cheat in an exchange. If one is engaged in 
transactions with the same person over time, then allowing another to 
injure or to cheat with no punishment is an invitation to exploit 
without end. Therefore, to be most successful in social exchange, one 
must have the capacity not only to detect but also to punish such 
persons. 
This implies that there might have been selection in humans 
for the cognitive mechanisms designed to detect inequities and, 
similarly, for the cognitive mechanisms that yield intuitions that 
motivate the punishment of people who violate the most ancient and 
fundamentally necessary principles of social exchange.54 In other 
words, the evolutionary history of social exchange has likely led to a 
 
 50. For a detailed list of these requirements, see Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 29, at 110. 
 51. See generally DE WAAL, supra note 39 (discussing reciprocal altruism and its basis in 
the remembrance of favors given and received). 
 52. Social exchange is the simultaneous or sequential delivery of benefits between two 
individuals for mutual profit. 
 53. See generally ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY (2000). 
Exchange allows non-zero-sum interactions, in which each participant is better off exchanging 
than alone. Id. at 26. 
 54. For recent discussion, see Herbert Gintis, Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality, 206 
J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 169 (2000). 
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reliably developing psychological system that is able to compute when 
someone has injured or cheated and to motivate punishment.55 
2. Intuitions of Justice as Generating Benefits for Individuals 
The argument sketched so far may explain why humans have 
intuitions that lead them to believe that people who have harmed or 
cheated them ought to be punished. However, this does not explain 
why people have intuitions that punishment should be imposed on 
wrongdoers in transactions in which they have no part. This 
question—why people care about third-party transactions—opens the 
door to an important mystery. Most non-human organisms attend very 
little to transactions that occur between unrelated others (though 
there are some important exceptions56). Why do humans care so much 
about these interactions? Our analysis follows along these lines: 
Once individuals possess intuitions about being wronged, 
detecting when others have been wronged is possible using the same 
set of intuitions. This does not, by itself, explain why individuals 
should care that someone else has been wronged; it merely explains 
the origin of the ability to detect wrongful acts toward others. 
What may explain the interest in wrongdoing to others is that 
individuals need to make decisions about the people with whom they 
interact, engage in social exchange, form groups and coalitions, and, 
more generally, socialize. One observing a third party committing a 
wrong against another person has important information about the 
perpetrator of the wrong; this information may make the observer less 
likely to choose that person for social interactions. 
Another puzzle exists: why do people have the intuition that 
wrongs to others should be punished? The evolutionary advantage of 
this intuition is debatable,57 but we advance some ideas that help 
explain the preference. The logic begins with the uncontroversial 
premise that humans evolved in relatively small groups consisting of 
people with whom they had a large number of transactions over a 
sustained period.58 Consider two kinds of groups: first, one in which 
individuals whose acts of unprovoked violence, theft, or cheating in 
exchanges is left unpunished and, second, one in which these acts are 
 
 55. For suggestive nonhuman evidence, see infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
 56. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
 57. For early thinking on this subject, see Trivers, supra note 47, passim, which discusses 
how selection can operate against those who fail to reciprocate; see also MATT RIDLEY, THE 
ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1996), which 
traces, among other things, the extent to which moralistic aggression can police fairness in social 
exchanges, and thereby increase the prevalence of reciprocity by increasing the cost of cheating. 
 58. See generally BOEHM, supra note 47, passim. 
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punished. In the second group, the individuals in the group benefit 
because they are less likely to be subject to violence, theft, or cheating. 
Thus, each person, to gain that benefit, has an incentive to inflict 
punishment on those who commit such offenses. Of course, 
punishment is potentially costly, so the long-term benefits of 
punishing must outweigh the long-term costs if it is to be selected.59 
And very recent experimental evidence in humans suggests that 
under such circumstances, given a choice, even prior transgressors 
choose to be in a group that punishes over one that is punishment-
free.60 
However, personally punishing wrongdoers is not the only way 
to increase the chances of being in a group in which undesirable acts 
are punished. One need not inflict punishment oneself. One can 
decrease the cost of inflicting punishment on wrongdoers by 
supporting or defending those who inflict the punishment. A third-
party punisher has a smaller risk of retaliation if group members 
endorse the punishment meted out by the third party. Accordingly, an 
individual benefits by having intuitions that support the 
punishment—by some individual—of those who transgress.61 In the 
 
 59. See Richerson & Boyd, supra note 46, passim. 
 60. Özgür Gürerk, Bernd Irlenbusch & Bettina Rockenbach, The Competitive Advantage of 
Sanctioning Institutions, 312 SCIENCE 108, 110 (2006). 
 61. Alexander made similar arguments regarding reputation and the effects on the group of 
having cooperative individuals. RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS 94, 
153 (1987). Trivers made a related argument. Robert Trivers, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 388 (1985) (“[A] 
sense of fairness has evolved in human beings as the standard against which to measure the 
behavior of other people, so as to guard against cheating in reciprocal relationships.”); see also 
Krebs, supra note 39, at 766-67 (noting that the high individual cost of punishment has 
prompted members of society to create institutions to catch and punish cheaters); Dennis L. 
Krebs, The Evolution of Moral Behaviors, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, 
ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS 337, 342 (Charles Crawford & Dennis L. Krebs eds., 1998) (arguing 
that deference gives rise to moral behavior that involves adherence to and respect for the rules 
and laws of authority); Robert Kurzban & Steven Neuberg, Managing Ingroup and Outgroup 
Relationships, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 39, at 659 (noting 
that punishment in social exchange is sensible if it prevents future cheating). 
We have considered the benefits flowing to individuals, as is standard in biology. Some, 
proposing “multi-level selection,” argue that considering benefits to the group yields an equal or 
superior analysis. See, e.g., ELLIOT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE 
EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR 331 (1998). In that view, groups that 
effectively cooperated because of widely shared and specific intuitions of justice that benefited 
the group could have outperformed groups without those intuitions, leading over time to more 
groups composed of more people who share those intuitions. Game theoretic analysis suggests 
that group-benefiting norms, and punishment through inflicting costs on those who do not follow 
such norms, can be a powerful evolutionary force in the adoption, spread, and maintenance of 
these norms. See, e.g., Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernst Fehr, Explaining 
Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 153, 154 (2003); see also Peter J. 
Richerson & Robert Boyd, The Evolution Of Subjective Commitment to Groups: A Tribal Instincts 
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small groups in which humans have evolved, the marginal benefit of 
having each individual support punishment for wrongdoings might 
have reduced the number of transgressions in the group and, thus, 
protected an individual’s health, property, and ability to make 
contracts.62 
If it is true that (1) individuals prefer that wrongdoers be 
punished and (2) individuals may not want to bear the costs of 
inflicting punishment, it is not surprising that means have been 
developed to satisfy these two preferences, though the means may 
differ across the centuries and cultures. For example, in some 
cultures,63 one person has special responsibilities and duties in the 
context of such punishment. In the West, punishment is administered 
by a system of criminal justice, which includes legislatures, police, 
judges, and so on. 
In short, shared intuitions of justice contribute to the ability of 
an individual or group to punish, which in turn provides an 
evolutionary advantage to all. In other words, there is an evolutionary 
advantage to understanding victimhood and to the concurrent 
condoning of the punishment of one who has engaged in wrongful 
conduct.64 This is important because the imposition of punishment—
the imposition of costs against the wrongdoer—is itself something that 
normally would be seen as a wrongful act. To produce conditions that 
avoid a never-ending spiral of wrongful acts, intuitions of justice must 
 
Hypothesis, in EVOLUTION AND THE CAPACITY FOR COMMITMENT 186-220 (Randolph M. Nesse 
ed., 2001). 
 62. This last element, contracts, is worth special consideration. Because of humans’ abilities 
to represent abstract costs and benefits, the number of social exchanges that are possible is 
much, much larger than in other organisms, who can exchange only narrowly delimited 
commodities. If an organism cannot translate how beneficial or costly an object or act is 
compared to another object or act, she cannot make good decisions about what counts as a good 
exchange. As the range of possible exchanges increases, the advantage of the ability to enforce 
contracts increases. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social 
Exchange, in THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF 
CULTURE 163, 177 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the computational 
requirements of social exchange). 
 63. The punishment of wrongdoers can be implemented in multiple ways. One way is for 
the individual who has been harmed to punish. Another way is for individuals not directly 
involved to inflict punishment. Among the Huron, for example, the obligation to slay a murderer 
reportedly fell upon the kin of the murderer. BRUCE G. TRIGGER, THE CHILDREN OF AATAENTSIC: 
A HISTORY OF THE HURON PEOPLE TO 1660, 59-60 (1976). Moreover, another way is for 
institutions to inflict punishment on those who have committed wrongs. This comes the closest to 
the way in which modern states impose punishment: through an official criminal justice system 
that formally represents all citizens of the state. 
 64. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 40 (1997) (quoting John Stuart Mill’s belief 
that our sense of justice involves a “desire to punish wrongdoers, even when we are not the 
victims”). 
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specify that wrongful acts can be punished without eliciting the 
further intuition that the punishers should themselves be punished. 
To distinguish deserved punishment, which is permitted, from 
undeserved punishment, which is not, the group obviously must share 
some sense of what constitutes wrongful conduct and the amount of 
punishment appropriate in any one case relative to other cases.65 If 
everyone in a group agrees on this—what constitutes a wrongful act 
and its relative wrongfulness as compared to other acts, hence the 
relative amount of punishment to be permitted—stability and 
cooperation, and the consequent benefits to members of the group, can 
be achieved.66 
Contributing to the institutional arrangement for punishment 
may not be the only reason that intuitions of justice evolved. Because 
social exchange is mutually beneficial, participation in exchange is 
desirable. When there are many social interactants in a group, there is 
competition to be selected as a partner in exchange. We should 
therefore expect that natural selection would favor predispositions 
that signal that one is a good candidate for participation in such 
exchanges. If one shares others’ moral intuitions—that cheating in an 
exchange is condemnable, for example—then one can expect selection 
to favor those who signal having such an intuition.67 Dennis Krebs and 
Kathy Denton recently made this argument: “[p]ersuading others that 
you are a fair, honest, generous, responsible and moral person who 
will make an attractive exchange partner may induce them to bestow 
benefits on you.”68 
The emergence of intuitions of justice has a self-sustaining 
character. Once the intuitions exist in a group, actions that violate 
others’ intuitions invite censure and punishment. Once the intuitions 
of justice exist, it is disadvantageous to reject publicly the principles of 
 
 65. The problem alluded to above, supra note 62, is essentially identical for punishment 
because the means of punishment is often not in the same coin as the offense. If intuitions of 
justice imply that harm should be inflicted on a perpetrator, then computing what constitutes a 
harm of appropriate magnitude is crucial. This is a richly debated topic in many modern areas of 
law (e.g., drug offenses). However, we believe that there are strong intuitions about the relative 
severity of offenses and suggest that the complexity of the psychological systems necessary to 
make such comparisons should not be underestimated. The cycle of harm, retaliation, and 
retaliation for retaliation can escalate if the original punishment is judged too great, given the 
magnitude of the offense. 
 66. See Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Solving the Puzzle of Human Cooperation, in 
EVOLUTION AND CULTURE 105, 114-19 (Stephen C. Levinson & Pierre Jaisson eds., 2006). 
 67. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF 
THE EMOTIONS (1988). 
 68. Dennis L. Krebs & Kathy Denton, Toward a More Pragmatic Approach to Morality: A 
Critical Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Model, 112 PSYCHOL. REV. 629, 642 (2005). 
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that system or to behave in ways that conflict with others’ intuitions.69 
Thus, persons who do not reliably behave consistently with those 
intuitions or do not signal their agreement in such shared intuitions 
will be disadvantaged as against those who do. 
To illustrate that “core” intuitions of justice should reliably 
develop in all humans, consider the fate of a mutation that causes 
individuals not to develop such intuitions. These individuals would be 
punished by those they injured, stole from, or cheated, and they would 
not be desired as social exchange partners or as members of groups. 
For a social creature, such a fate would have been a reproductive 
disaster.70 The individual costs associated with having diverging 
intuitions from those shared by others are a powerful force for 
homogenizing the intuitions of justice.71 Thus, once intuitions of 
justice are in place, there would be strong pressure favoring any 
variant in humans that acquires those intuitions, thus stabilizing 
them and making them essentially universal in the species.72 
One might wonder why some details of human intuitions of 
justice are widely shared, while others are not.73 Intuitions of justice 
that were advantageous no matter what the context should be 
relatively consistent across individuals and should develop reliably 
regardless of one’s local environment.74 These “core” intuitions 
probably include the notions that unjustified physical aggression, the 
taking of another’s property, and cheating in exchanges are all wrong 
 
 69. Indeed, formal game theoretical analyses have shown that punishment can lead 
individuals to behave in accordance with an arbitrarily wide array of norms. Robert Boyd & 
Peter J. Richerson, Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizable 
Groups, 13 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 171 (1992). 
 70. Robert Kurzban & Mark R. Leary, Evolutionary Origins of Stigmatization: The 
Functions of Social Exclusion, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 187, 192 (2001); see also Roy F. Baumeister & 
Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental 
Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 521 (1995). 
 71. See, e.g., Joe Henrich & Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Conformist Transmission and the 
Emergence of Between-Group Differences, 19 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 215, 236 (1998). 
 72. Our argument does not turn on universality without exception. Most features of most 
species appear in ranges reflecting variation in the genes and environments that give rise to 
unique organisms. The breadth and distributions of features within those ranges is sensitive to 
(among other things) the strength of selection pressures. Our argument is that there is good 
reason to hypothesize that selection pressures in this context would yield very similar intuitions 
of justice that are widespread across the human species. 
 73. See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 7, at 1892-93, for a comparison of Parts I-III with 
Part IV, noting that some intuitions of justice seem to be universal, while others outside the 
“core” wrongdoings spark much disagreement. 
 74. See JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 123, 189 (1984) (discussing the 
existence of universal moral standards); see also Richard A. Shweder & Jonathan Haidt, The 
Future of Moral Psychology: Truth, Intuition and the Pluralist Way, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 360, 363 
(1993) (discussing cognitive intuitionism’s assumptions regarding the objectivity of moral 
qualities). 
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and should be punished.75 In contrast, it is unlikely that conduct that 
less directly prevented beneficial social interaction—or that was more 
dependent on social, economic, or other contexts—will be included in 
the “core” intuitions that reliably develop today in all environments. 
This is reflected in the cross-cultural, and even within-group, 
divergence on such issues as drug use or prostitution, in which the 
core intuitions regarding harm, theft, and deception are not violated. 
III. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION 
In Part II, we provided an evolutionary explanation for the 
little-acknowledged but stunningly consistent and widely shared 
intuitions of justice. On present evidence, one cannot know whether 
our specific evolutionary explanation is correct. Unlike bones, 
behavior does not fossilize, and one can only test the accuracy of 
evolutionary accounts of behavior by triangulating from available 
sources of information. This requires combining theories, offered in 
Part II, with observations and experiments, which we take up in this 
Part. 
There is a good deal of empirical work that needs to be done, 
but in the meantime, we can look to three existing areas that shed 
some light on our hypothesis. First, we consider animal studies that 
suggest evolved, rudimentary notions of fairness and blaming. Second, 
we consider brain science studies that reveal identifiable physiological 
processes at work when humans make moral judgments. Finally, we 
examine the field of developmental psychology, which demonstrates a 
common path in the development of moral reasoning in the human 
child across demographics and cultures. We conclude that all three 
areas provide evidence generally consistent with our evolutionary 
hypothesis. In contrast, we know of no data in direct conflict with it. 
A. Animal Studies Evidence 
If the evolutionary explanation for shared intuitions of justice 
is correct, one might expect to find in other animals—especially our 
close primate relatives—rudimentary forms of humans’ core intuitions 
about what constitutes wrongdoing and how it should be punished. In 
 
 75. See Jones, supra note 20, at 847-67, 860 fig.9 (arguing that these three notions, 
alongside several others, have evolutionary roots). As a consequence, and to the extent that 
evolutionary processes influence the content of predispositions, emotions, intuitions of justice, 
and morality, the major features of legal systems will tend to reflect that influence. See id.; Jones 
& Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 466-475, 474 tbl.1. For recent elaboration, see Robin Bradley Kar, 
The Deep Structure of Law and Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 877 (2006). 
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fact, a number of socially cooperative species appear in some 
circumstances to exhibit characteristics of “punishing” aggressors and 
cheaters. And a number of researchers now suggest that such 
behaviors may reflect a rudimentary moral sense or intuition of 
justice.76 Victims, the victims’ relatives, and others sometimes avoid or 
act aggressively towards individuals that deviate from various group 
or dyadic norms and expectations.  
These phenomena are not limited to primates, or even to 
mammals Here are a few of many examples. In one social species of 
wren, “helpers” assist by providing food when the young are being 
raised. Helpers experimentally removed from the group during that 
period are usually attacked and harassed upon their return, while 
helpers absent at other times of the year are never attacked.77 Within 
the highly social naked mole rat communities, queens appear to focus 
attacks on lazy workers.78 Wolves apparently refuse to play with those 
who violate the social rule against injurious play-fighting, and those 
wolves leave the groups and die at higher-than-average rates.79 
Researchers studying animal punishment patterns have found 
that behavior akin to theft is one particular target for retribution.80 
For example, elephant seal pups caught trying to nurse from a female 
who is not their mother are not just shooed away. Often, they are 
bitten severely and sometimes killed.81 Young male deer attempting to 
sneak copulations with females being guarded by adult males are 
regularly attacked.82 
 
 76. For an alternative view, see Jeffrey R. Stevens & Marc D. Hauser, Why Be Nice? 
Psychological Constraints on the Evolution of Cooperation, 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 60, 61 
(2004), which distinguishes punishment from harassment. 
 77. Raoul A. Mulder & Naomi E. Langmore, Dominant Males Punish Helpers for Temporary 
Defection in Superb Fairy-Wrens, 45 ANIMAL BEHAV. 830, 831 (1993). 
 78. Hudson K. Reeve, Queen Activation of Lazy Workers in Colonies of the Eusocial Naked 
Mole-Rat, 358 NATURE 147, 147-48 (1992). 
 79. Marc Bekoff, Wild Justice, Cooperation, and Fair Play, in THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF 
SOCIALITY 53, 62 (Robert W. Sussman & Audrey R. Chapman eds., 2004). 
 80. T.H. Clutton-Brock & G. A. Parker, Punishment in Animal Societies, 373 NATURE 209, 
212 (1995). 
 81. Id. (citing Joanne Reiter, Nell Lee Stinson & Burney J. Le Boeuf, Northern Elephant 
Seal Development: The Transition from Weaning to Nutritional Independence, 3 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 
& SOCIOBIOLOGY 337, 344 (1978); Joanne Reiter, Kathy J. Panken & Burney J. Le Boeuf, Female 
Competition and Reproductive Success in Northern Elephant Seals, 29 ANIMAL BEHAV. 670, 676 
(1981)). 
 82. Clutton-Brock & Parker, supra note 80 (citing T.H. Clutton-Brock, S.D. Albon, R.M. 
Gibson & F.E. Guinness, The Logical Stag: Adaptive Aspects of Fighting in Red Deer (Cervus 
elaphus L.), 27 ANIMAL BEHAV. 211, 212 (1979); T.H. Clutton-Brock, D. Green, M. Hiraiwa-
Hasegawa & S.D. Albon, Passing the Buck: Resource Defence, Lek Breeding and Mate Choice in 
Fallow Deer, 23 BEHAV. ECOLOGY & SOCIOBIOOLOGY 281, 287-88 (1988)). 
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With respect to an animal sense of fair treatment, a leading 
researcher has concluded that a wide variety of animals is capable of 
discerning when a situation is not equitable.83 For example, in a 
recent and widely reported experiment with capuchin monkeys, 
different combinations of two adjacent monkeys regularly alternated 
returning granite tokens for cucumber slices. When the experimenter 
began to provide one monkey with a grape (a more highly valued food) 
in exchange for the same token that continued to yield mere 
cucumbers for the other monkey, that other monkey often manifested 
considerable distress. It sometimes jumped up and down, throwing the 
token or the cucumber at the researcher, refusing to eat the cucumber, 
and the like.84 This led the authors of the study to conclude that 
capuchins are capable of comparing their own reward to the reward 
others receive, and accepting or rejecting rewards according to their 
relative, not absolute, value.85 Similarly, chimpanzees reportedly will 
often refuse to participate in an exchange once another chimpanzee is 
receiving a more valued reward for the same amount of effort.86 Thus, 
both capuchins and chimpanzees behave in ways suggesting that they 
can perceive unfairness and that it often agitates them. 
Behavior suggesting an ability to perceive inequities appears to 
underlie a great deal of social behavior in primates, in whom 
transgressive acts are most systematically punished. By way of 
background, many primates regularly exhibit sophisticated 
cooperation, which ranges from simple reciprocal grooming and food-
sharing to complex tool-using and coalitional behavior. For example, 
in olive baboons there is a strong correlation between A’s prior support 
in a conflict for a fellow baboon B, and A’s successful recruitment of B 
to a new conflict in which A becomes involved.87 In macaques, 
individuals have been observed to support unrelated others, who have 
previously supported them by intervening in conflicts on their 
behalf.88 Vervet monkeys tend to groom preferentially individuals who 
 
 83. Sarah F. Brosnan, Nonhuman Species’ Reactions to Inequity and Their Implications for 
Fairness, 19 SOC. JUST. RES. 153, 181 (2006). 
 84. Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 NATURE 
297, 298 (2003); Sarah Brosnan & Frans de Waal, Reply, Animal Behavior: Fair Refusal by 
Capuchin Monkeys, 428 NATURE 140, 140 (2004) [hereinafter Brosnan & de Waal, Reply]. 
 85. Bosnan & de Waal, Reply, supra note 84. 
 86. Brosnan, supra note 83, at 177; Sarah F. Brosnan, Hillary C. Schiff & Frans B.M. de 
Waal, Tolerance for Inequity May Increase with Social Closeness in Chimpanzees, 272 PROC.: 
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 253, 255 (2005). 
 87. C. Packer, Reciprocal Altruism in Papio Anubis, 265 NATURE 441, 442 (1977). 
 88. Jessica C. Flack & Frans B.M. de Waal, “Any Animal Whatever”: Darwinian Building 
Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes, in EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MORALITY: CROSS-
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 1, 12 (Leonard D. Katz ed., 2000); Frans B.M. de Waal & Lesleigh 
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have groomed them in the past.89 When one chimpanzee grooms 
another, early in the day, the latter is more likely to share food with 
the former, later in the day.90 And chimpanzees experimentally 
engaged in tasks requiring collaboration quickly determine which 
among different potential collaborators is most effective and recruit 
that individual preferentially for subsequent collaborative tasks.91 
On the other hand, failure to cooperate regularly yields sharp 
consequences. Negative acts are the flip side of the cooperation coin. 
Authors of a leading paper on the subject conclude that the intensity 
of punishments often increases with the severity of harm caused by 
transgressors.92 For example, rhesus macaques who discover food and 
are caught having failed to alert the group to its discovery often 
become targets of significant aggression.93 In chimpanzee societies, 
those reluctant to share when they have food are more likely to 
encounter aggressive responses when they later approach those who 
have food.94 Chimpanzees will attack former allies who failed to assist 
them in conflicts with third parties.95 And many primates, including 
chimpanzees, tend to intervene most often against those who have 
most often intervened against them.96 These patterns have prompted 
leading researchers to refer to such negative reciprocities as a 
“revenge system.”97 
 
M. Luttrell, The Similarity Principle Underlying Social Bonding Among Female Rhesus 
Monkeys, 46 FOLIA PRIMATOLOGICA 215 (1986). 
 89. See Robert M. Seyfarth & Dorothy L. Cheney, Grooming, Alliances and Reciprocal 
Altruism in Vervet Monkeys, 308 NATURE 541, 542 (1984). 
 90. Frans B.M. de Waal, Food Sharing and Reciprocal Obligations Among Chimpanzees, 18 
J. HUM. EVOLUTION 433, 433 (1989). 
 91. Alicia P. Melis, Brian Hare & Michael Tomasello, Chimpanzees Recruit the Best 
Collaborators, 311 SCIENCE 1297, 1299 (2006). 
 92. Clutton-Brock & Parker, supra note 80, at 211. 
 93. Marc D. Hauser, Costs of Deception: Cheaters Are Punished in Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca 
mulatta), 89 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12,137, 12,137 (1992); Marc D. Hauser & Peter Marler, 
Food-Associated Calls in Rhesus Macaques (Macaca mulatta): II. Costs and Benefits of Call 
Production and Suppression, 4 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 206, 206 (1993). 
 94. De Waal, supra note 90, at 456; see also DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 160 (concluding 
such behavior “suggests a sense of justice and fairness”). 
 95. FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX AMONG APES 207 (1998). 
 96. Flack & de Waal, supra note 88, at 8; Joan B. Silk, The Patterning of Intervention 
Among Male Bonnet Macaques: Reciprocity, Revenge, and Loyalty, 33 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 
318 (1992). 
 97. See, e.g., Fillipo Aureli et al., Kin-oriented Redirection Among Japanese Macaques: An 
Expression of a Revenge System?, 44 ANIMAL BEHAV. 283, 289-90 (1992) (“Macaques might have 
an indirect revenge system in which kin relationships play a decisive role.”); Frans B.M. de Waal 
& Lesleigh M. Luttrell, Mechanisms of Social Reciprocity in Three Primate Species: Symmetrical 
Relationship Characteristics or Cognition, 9 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 101, 114 (1998) (“Only 
this species exhibits what may be called a revenge system: chimpanzees tend to intervene 
against individuals who intervene against themselves.”).  
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Indeed, among chimpanzees (who, along with bonobos, are the 
closest relatives of humans) retribution is common enough that 
researchers consider retaliation “an integral part of [a] system of 
reciprocity.”98 Because sharing and other cooperative behavior exists 
in a “multi-faceted matrix of relationships, social pressures, delayed 
rewards, and mutual obligations,”99 the most successful individuals 
are those who can distinguish good colleagues from bad and deal with 
each accordingly. Frans de Waal, a prominent primatologist, 
consequently describes their community as “a ‘market’ of reward and 
punishment,”100 with “balance sheets” on social interactions.101 Indeed, 
reciprocity rules consisted of “ ‘one good turn deserves another’ and ‘an 
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.’ ”102 “Not only are beneficial actions 
rewarded,” de Waal concludes, but “there seems to be a tendency to 
teach a lesson to those who act negatively.”103 Reward good deeds and 
punish the bad. 
The data available, of which the foregoing is only a sample, do 
not prove definitively that some core aspects of human intuitions of 
justice are evolved adaptations.104 Nor, even if they are adaptations, 
did they necessarily arise from the same roots as related intuitions in 
other species. However, indifference to wrongdoing in highly 
cooperative species is exploited easily by cheaters and free-riders, and 
therefore potentially unstable.105 Consequently, one would expect 
frequently to observe punishment (as well as retaliation, selective 
ostracism, and the like) of wrongdoing in ultra-social species such as 
ours. And the intersecting vectors of available animal evidence point 
toward that conclusion. Moreover, the close relationship of humans, 
chimpanzees, and other primates suggests that we ought not 
gratuitously, uneconomically, and unparsimoniously assume that 
 
 98. DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 157-58. 
 99. De Waal, supra note 90, at 452. 
 100. Id. 
 101. DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 157-59. 
 102. DE WAAL, supra note 95; see also Flack & de Waal, supra note 88, at 9 (“Monkeys and 
apes appear capable of holding received services in mind, selectively repaying those individuals 
who performed the favours. They seem to hold negative acts in mind as well, leading to 
retribution and revenge.”). 
 103. DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 159; see also Flack & de Waal, supra note 88, at 9 
(describing similar behavior among monkeys and apes). 
 104. Indeed, some dispute whether primates actually use negative sanctions to shape 
behavior of third parties or to punish deviation from social norms. Joan B. Silk, The Evolution of 
Cooperation in Primate Groups, in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 43, 60-64 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005). 
 105. In game theoretic terms, a behavioral “strategy” is evolutionarily unstable if it can be 
outcompeted by an alternative strategy. See generally JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND 
THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982). 
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there are different causes in humans for the same behaviors in other 
animals.106 It is not surprising, then, that the leading animal 
researchers believe that evolution has supplied the “building blocks” of 
human morality107 and that the question is not whether biology has 
influenced the development of human moral systems, but rather to 
what degree.108 “Evolution,” they believe, “has produced the requisites 
for morality: a tendency to develop social norms and enforce them.”109 
B. Brain Science Evidence 
Some people may balk at the notion that intuitions of justice 
could be the product of evolution, even indirectly, because views of 
justice are obviously matters of complex judgment making. The design 
of one’s visual system might be the product of evolution, but how could 
evolution affect a person’s judgment concerning what punishment is 
deserved? 
Specialized brain structures and brain processes determine all 
decisionmaking, no matter how complex. And neuroscience has begun 
to provide details on what structures do what. As demonstrated below, 
we now know that specific brain regions perform certain kinds of 
reasoning tasks, and moral judgment, in particular, has been shown to 
involve specific brain regions that interact differently depending on 
the exact nature of the moral decision presented. 
Contrary to prior assumptions,110 we also know today that the 
brain is anatomically and functionally specialized. Different parts of 
the brain acting in varying combinations perform different 
information-processing tasks that in turn influence a person’s 
behavior. Scientists have investigated the functions of different parts 
of the human brain by observing what happens when different brain 
 
 106. DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 64. 
 107. Flack & de Waal, supra note 88, at 19-24; see also HAUSER, supra note 45 (“We can 
safely assume that these intuitions evolved prior to or during our life as hunter-gatherers . . . . In 
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acts.”); DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 218 (“The fact that the human moral sense goes so far back in 
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 108. Flack & de Waal, supra note 88, at 3. 
 109. DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 39; see also RICHARD JOYCE, THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY 
140-42 (2006) (explaining the evolution of fairness); Sarah F. Brosnan, Fairness in Monkeys, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 288, 288-89 (Marc Bekoff ed., 2004); Brosnan, supra note 
83, at 160-61; Brosnan & de Waal, Reply, supra note 84; Frans B.M. de Waal, The Chimpanzee’s 
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SCIENTIST 335, 345-49 (1991). 
 110. See generally PINKER, supra note 24, passim (discussing such assumptions). For more 
on functional specialization, see STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1999). 
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locations are experimentally stimulated, different regions of the brain 
are removed or damaged, or a person within a brain scanning device is 
engaged in decisionmaking. 
A wealth of experimental evidence demonstrates that artificial 
stimulation of different areas of the brain affects perception, cognition, 
and behavior differently. Using electrical stimulation in non-human 
primates, for example, researchers have manipulated the activity of 
small groups of neurons, ultimately establishing causal links between 
the activities of those cells and specific aspects of perception or 
cognition.111 And with non-invasive stimulation studies on humans 
(such as transcranial magnetic stimulation), researchers have 
discovered predictable interference with different cognitive tasks 
when the activity of a specific portion of the brain is disrupted 
artificially.112 
With respect to discoveries arising from cases of brain damage, 
consider the well-studied case of Phineas Gage, a reliable and 
personable railroad worker of normal social disposition, who had a 
metal tamping rod pass cleanly through his skull and brain after a 
spark ignited the dynamite he was tamping into its hole.113 The rod 
removed Gage’s medial prefrontal cortex and, although he appeared to 
retain all of his essential mental faculties, he became bizarrely anti-
social.114 Similarly, a variety of recent studies have identified ways in 
which relatively localized and discrete brain damage and lesions in 
particular brain areas can result in severe impingement on the 
acquisition of social knowledge, on social behavior, and on moral 
reasoning.115 For example, damage to the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, particularly of a young child, renders that person morally 
incompetent.116 And a condition known as “acquired sociopathy” often 
 
 111. Marlene R. Cohen & William T. Newsome, What Electrical Microstimulation has 
Revealed about the Neural Basis of Cognition, 14 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 169, 169-75 
(2004) (providing overview of studies). 
 112. Alvaro Pascual-Leone et al., Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation in Cognitive 
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 115. Joshua Greene, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, in THE 
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results from damage to the orbitomedial or polar frontal cortex, the 
anterior temporal lobe, or the superomedial frontal lobe.117 
Even more significant are the results of brain imaging studies. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”), which tracks both 
locations and amplitudes of activity in the brain,118 has shown that 
specific parts of the brain—the orbital and medial sectors of the 
prefrontal cortex, as well as the superior temporal sulcus, among 
others119—are involved in moral reasoning and also show how the 
subareas work together in predictable ways during the process of 
making a moral decision.120 
Not only does this work reveal the underappreciated extent to 
which processes of evolution and development have yielded highly 
specialized brain operations, evolutionary premises explicitly underlie 
the hypotheses of some of the most significant studies of moral 
decisionmaking. For example, Joshua Greene and colleagues started 
from the premise that elements of basic emotions (such as fear, 
jealousy, and anger) are evolved short cuts to behaviors that were 
adaptive for their bearers, on average, in deep ancestral 
environments. That is, compared to more cumbersome analysis and 
deliberation, emotions are generally “reliable, quick, and efficient” 
ways of solving commonly encountered circumstances.121 
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These researchers therefore predicted that the more closely a 
moral scenario aligns with regular features of ancestral environments, 
the more likely it is to invoke evolved emotional reactions, rather than 
dispassionately cognitive and deliberative ones. And the results were 
consistent with those predictions. Specifically, more physically 
personal dilemmas, such as whether to push one person into harm’s 
way, thereby deflecting that harm from several people, yields greater 
activity in the brain areas associated with emotions, while a less 
personal but analogous dilemma, such as whether to throw a switch 
that would deflect an oncoming harm onto one person instead of 
several, yields greater activity in a different brain area, associated 
with less passionate analysis and calculation.122 
Of course, such evidence does not suggest that there is a single, 
evolved, discretely boundaried “morality module” in the brain.123 The 
situation is more complex. Some of the regions associated with moral 
decisionmaking are also associated with other brain activities. But 
what is clear is that an identifiable subset of the brain’s regions, 
despite anatomical dissociability, are regularly and intimately 
networked in assessing moral dilemmas. And the interaction of these 
regions changes predictably as the nature of the moral dilemma 
changes.124 
In another study, researchers found that people make faster 
decisions, and with less activity in the deliberating temporal poles, 
when moral scenarios involve bodily harm than when they do not.125 
Another study showed significantly greater activity in the right 
amygdala, left medial orbitofrontal cortex, and medial frontal gyrus 
when subjects were shown interpersonal violence than when shown 
vandalism or violence to objects.126 Compared to scenarios with 
unintentional harm, scenarios involving intentional harm yield 
greater activity in areas associated with emotion (such as the 
orbitofrontal cortex and the temporal pole) with correspondingly less 
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activity in areas associated with deliberative cognition (such as the 
angular gyrus and superior frontal gyrus).127 Moral scenarios in which 
action and inaction result in the same amount of harm yield greater 
activity in areas associated with deliberative cognition (such as the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and correspondingly less activity in 
areas associated with emotion (including the orbitofrontal cortex and 
temporal pole) than do analogous nonmoral scenarios. This suggests 
that “[i]ndividuals will utilize varying combinations of cognitive and 
emotive facilities to address moral challenges, but, overall, certain 
types of moral scenarios are likely to be processed in characteristic 
ways.”128 Further, removing emotive components of decisionmaking 
does not render people hyper-ethical, it instead renders them “unable 
to feel the rightness and wrongness of simple decisions and 
judgments.”129 
This area of research is relatively new. Nevertheless, the 
foregoing, in conjunction with other studies, has led a variety of 
researchers to conclude that our moral intuitions are built on evolved 
and widely shared building blocks.130 Marc Hauser, for example, 
concludes that the evidence points to “all humans [being] endowed 
with a moral faculty.”131 Joshua Greene argues that the evidence 
suggests that “the form of human moral thought is importantly 
shaped by the innate structure of the human mind and that some 
basic, prosocial tendencies probably provide human morality with 
innate content.”132 And both argue that, while moral decisionmaking is 
networked, rather than unitary, it is networked in a way distinctly 
analogous to the brain’s innate grammar (which is the basic grammar 
design one is born with and which underlies all human languages 
despite regional cultural variation).133 That is to say, these authors 
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and others conclude that the basic moral sentiments humans share 
are products of evolutionary processes.134 
C. Child Development Evidence 
The child development literature provides much collateral 
support for the evolutionary theory offered in Part II. First, there is 
evidence that children’s intuitions of justice progress through 
consistent stages of development across cultures. In the same way 
that baby teeth grow from gums and adult teeth replace baby teeth, 
intuitions about morality and justice seem to develop according to a 
relatively predictable sequence. Second, the cognitive skills that 
underpin these intuitions are precocious, with children able to make 
important conceptual distinctions relevant to morality and justice at 
young ages. Finally, the content of the intuitions of justice tracks the 
core intuitions discussed above, with injury, theft, and fairness being 
among the first principles of justice understood by young children. 
1. Predictable Stages of Development 
There is a great deal of data about the development of moral 
reasoning in children. The classic—if somewhat dated—body of 
research in the area is Lawrence Kohlberg’s work,135 recently 
described as “the most widely researched description of moral 
development available.”136 Kohlberg’s view is that people go through a 
predictable sequence of phases of moral thinking.137 As Jerome Kagan 
suggests, one would expect this if the capacity for learning moral 
reasoning were like the capacity for learning language.138 That is, 
reliable, consistent, cross-situational development is a hallmark of the 
 
 134. For example, Haidt and Bjorklund argue that “moral beliefs and motivations come from 
a small set of intuitions that evolution has prepared the human brain to develop . . . .” Haidt & 
Bjorklund, supra note 129 (manuscript at 2). Greene & Haidt, supra note 120, at 517, conclude 
that moral intuitions “are shaped by natural selection, as well as by cultural forces.” 
 135. See, e.g., 2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1984); Lawrence Kohlberg, From Is to Ought: How to Commit the 
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development, in COGNITIVE 
DEVELOPMENT AND EPISTEMOLOGY (Theodore Mischel ed., 1971); see also 1 ANNE COLBY & 
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE MEASUREMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT (1987); 2 ANNE COLBY & 
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE MEASURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT (1987). 
 136. LARRY P. NUCCI, EDUCATION IN THE MORAL DOMAIN 81 (2001). 
 137. This view parallels Piaget’s views on development. See generally 1 LAWRENCE 
KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981) 
(linking cognitive and moral development). 
 138. Jerome Kagan, Introduction to THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN ix, 
ix-x (Jerome Kagan & Sharon Lamb eds., 1987). 
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existence of a specific set of psychological mechanisms designed for a 
particular function by natural selection.139 
For our purposes, it is not important whether Kohlberg’s 
scheme is the best way of describing the various stages of 
development. What is significant is the evidence, particularly from 
recent research (see below), of a predictable developmental path for all 
humans, however that path might be conceptualized and described. To 
the extent that children everywhere progress through similar stages of 
moral reasoning about justice at roughly the same ages, our 
evolutionary explanation for the origins of intuitions of justice receives 
collateral support.140 As suggested by Kagan, “temporal concordance 
 
 139. Kohlberg believed that as children develop more sophisticated ways of thinking (for 
example, from the concrete to the abstract, see BÄRBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH 
OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE xxiii-xxiv (1958), which describes 
early work of Inhelder and Piaget studying the development of intelligence in humans), they also 
develop more sophisticated moral conceptualizations. Kohlberg’s sequence is divided into three 
“levels” each with two “stages.” His view might be summarized as: 
Level 
(age range) 
Stage Description of Moral Behavior 
Pre-conventional 
(5-10) 
Obedience/ 
Punishment 
Conform to norms because of potential for punishment by 
authority figures.  
 Individualism/ 
Exchange 
Do what is “good” (i.e., feels good) for the self. This includes 
beneficial exchanges with others.  
Conventional 
(10-14) 
Good/Bad Behave so as to elicit approval from others. 
 
 Law and Order Behave so as to discharge one’s duty as part of the social order.  
Post-Conventional 
(14-adult) 
Social Contract Acting in a way that benefits others because of rationally-based 
laws/norms in a society. Individual rights and utilitarianism.  
 “Universal 
ethical principle 
orientation” 
“Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord 
with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical 
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency.” 
 (Quotations from KOHLBERG, supra note 137, at 16-19, 24-25, 409-12, are used for the stage 
name and description because it is difficult to gloss these ideas.) Kohlberg argued that people 
universally progressed from lower to higher stages of moral development. He did not argue that 
everyone reached the highest stage, “universal ethical principle orientation.” The early stages, 
the “pre-conventional” stages, commonly from ages five through ten, are essentially about self-
interest. The intermediate “conventional” levels, commonly ages ten through fourteen, in 
contrast, reflect an awareness of the benefits of having a positive reputation as a moral agent 
and of fulfilling one’s duties in the context of social exchange. The highest level, the “post-
conventional” stages, commonly from ages fourteen onward, includes a genuine interest in 
others’ welfare, a respect for others’ rights, and a recognition of universal moral principles. More 
recent approaches to Kohlberg’s model maintain the idea that stages are reached in sequence, 
but instead of one stage “replacing” another, each stage is seen as supplementing the logic of 
previous stages. Dennis L. Krebs & Kathy Denton, Toward a More Pragmatic Approach to 
Morality: A Critical Evaluation of Kohlberg’s Model, 112 PSYCHOL. REV. 629, 633 (2005). On this 
view, a person who has reached Stage 4 will still use Stage 3 reasoning in circumstances where 
doing so is useful or desirable. Id. at 645. 
 140. The first evolutionary perspective on Kohlberg’s work of which we are aware appears in 
ALEXANDER, supra note 61, at 131-39. 
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implies a biologically based preparedness to judge acts as right or 
wrong, where preparedness is used with the same sense intended by 
linguists who claim that two-year-old children are prepared to speak 
their language.”141 
Imagine the reverse case. If there were no specific 
developmental system for the acquisition of moral intuitions, if 
intuitions of justice were simply a matter of general social learning, 
then the developmental route of the acquisition of intuitions of justice 
would depend on the environment in which the child developed. The 
things that the child learned were wrong would include acts the child 
witnessed, ideas communicated through language, pedagogy from 
various sources, and so forth. Because all of these elements are likely 
to differ widely across cultures, and even across family and peer 
groups within cultures, such a general learning system would yield 
very different paths and timing in the acquisition of intuitions of 
justice for different individuals.142 
2. Making Subtle and Complex Judgments at an Early Age 
Early research in this area seems to have vastly 
underestimated the sophistication of children. More recent research 
demonstrates that children are able to make far more sophisticated 
judgments and much finer distinctions than those predicted by 
Kohlberg’s proposed sequence. Although evidence now suggests that 
moral reasoning develops relatively early, it is likely that research 
still does not fully reveal the precociousness of moral reasoning.143 
John Darley and Thomas Shultz suggest in their broad review that 
“children are capable of making moral judgments at a much earlier 
age than previously thought.”144 Summarizing recent literature, the 
authors conclude that “moral capacity is well developed although by 
no means completely developed in the third year of life.”145 The 
precocious abilities of young children support the evolutionary 
argument in Part II. To the extent that very young children have 
intuitions, acquire knowledge, and make conceptual distinctions, 
especially universally, the probability that each child acquires these 
 
 141. Kagan, supra note 138, at x. 
 142. For a fuller discussion of general social learning as an alterative explanation, see infra 
Part IV. 
 143. See Lawrence Kohlberg, A Current Statement on Some Theoretical Issues, in LAWRENCE 
KOHLBERG: CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSY 485, 491 (Sohan Modgil & Celia Modgil eds., 1986); 
see also John M. Darley & Thomas R. Shultz, Moral Rules: Their Content and Acquisition, 41 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 525, 537 (1990). 
 144. Darley & Shultz, supra note 143, at 552. 
 145. Id. 
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by general learning processes decreases, and a more innate 
developmental sequence becomes more likely.146 
a. Distinguishing Moral, Conventional, and Prudential Rules 
In one early and crucial experiment, Judith Smetana tested 
very young children’s beliefs about justice to determine if they make 
distinctions between violations of moral rules—acts that are wrong 
and deserve punishment (for example, one child hitting another)—and 
violations of conventional rules—acts that deviate from a convention 
(for example, failing to say grace before a snack).147 Smetana used 
pictures indicating the acts to demonstrate violations. To elicit 
responses, a pictorial scale (different-size frowns) was used to gauge 
seriousness. Smetana also used a verbal assessment of how harshly 
the offender should be punished: not at all, a little, or a lot. One group 
of subjects consisted of children between two-and-a-half to roughly 
three-and-a-half years old. The other group consisted of children 
between roughly three-and-a-half and almost five years old. Moral 
offenses included both physical harm (hitting) and theft (taking 
someone else’s apple). Both groups indicated that the moral 
transgressions were more serious and deserved more punishment 
than the conventional transgressions. The children indicated that the 
moral offenses, compared with the violations of convention, would be 
wrong even if “there [were] no rule about it.”148 
These results suggest that even very young children 
distinguish moral wrongs from violations of convention and apply a 
different logic to them. Moreover, children seem to consider moral 
offenses to be serious: the majority of subjects in both groups rated the 
moral offenses as a four on the four-point scale. When tested two to 
three weeks later, subjects responded much as they had earlier, 
suggesting a consistency in judgments.149 
The importance of these results should not be underestimated. 
The fact that such young children believe immoral acts are wrong, 
even in the absence of rules, indicates a precocious, universalist view 
 
 146. We take “innate” ideas to be those ideas that develop reliably in each member of the 
species given the broad range of plausible environments in which the organism develops. That is, 
an idea is innate if it does not rely on very general processes such as induction or social 
transmission for its acquisition. 
 147. See Judith G. Smetana, Preschool Children’s Conceptions of Moral and Social Rules, 52 
CHILD DEV. 1333, 1333-34 (1981). 
 148. Id. at 1334-35. 
 149. Test-retest reliability was .66 for the fourteen subjects so tested, a reasonable number 
by traditional standards in experimental developmental psychology. Id. at 1334. 
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of morality.150 In sharp contrast, children believe that conventions 
apply to a particular group at a particular time and can be changed. 
According to Judith Dunn, the evidence suggests that “by three and 
four years old, children respond differently to different kinds of rule 
breaking or transgression” and that “[a]lthough the data do not show 
unambiguously a clear distinction between transgressions of social 
convention and of moral standards, they demonstrate that three-year-
olds are sensitive to different kinds of cultural breach.”151 Other 
scholars take a stronger view: 
[C]hildren at early ages . . . judge moral issues to be obligatory, applicable across like 
situations, not contingent on specific social rules or authority-dictates, and not alterable 
on an arbitrary basis. They judge conventions as contingent on social organization—
such as rules, authority, and existing arrangements.152 
Somewhat older children similarly distinguish between moral 
rules and “prudential rules”—rules that are in place to protect people 
from harm (for example, a rule prohibiting climbing on the back of a 
sofa). Marie Tisak and Elliot Turiel gave children (average ages of the 
groups were roughly seven, nine, and eleven) stories about acts that 
violated either moral rules (regarding theft or hitting) or prudential 
rules (regarding running and falling).153 Subjects reported that the 
violation of the moral rule was more wrong and that it would be more 
wrong to change moral rules.154 In other words, it is more acceptable 
for the prudential rule to be modified. The comparison between moral 
rules and prudential rules indicates judgments that go beyond 
consideration of consequences of rule-violating actions. Again, the 
results of Tisak and Turiel suggest the development of nuanced views 
at early ages. 
 
 150. See Judith G. Smetana et al., Preschool Children’s Judgments about Hypothetical and 
Actual Transgressions, 64 CHILD DEV. 202, 211 (1993) (reporting on a study that found preschool 
children differentiate between moral and conventional transgressions, finding moral 
transgressions more generally wrong regardless of the existence of rules). 
 151. Judith Dunn, The Beginnings of Moral Understanding: Development in the Second Year, 
in THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 138, at 91, 93. 
 152. Elliot Turiel, Melanie Killen & Charles C. Helwig, Morality: Its Structure, Functions, 
and Vagaries, in THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 138, at 155, 
170; see also Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your 
Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 613, 621 (1993) (observing that children ten to twelve 
years old across the cultures investigated think that pushing another child off a swing should be 
punished and that this behavior would be wrong in other countries as well). 
 153. Marie S. Tisak & Elliot Turiel, Children’s Conceptions of Moral and Prudential Rules, 
55 CHILD DEV. 1030, 1031 (1984). 
 154. Id. at 1028. 
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b. Judging the Relative Seriousness of Wrongful Conduct 
Studies suggest that even young children intuitively appreciate 
the relative seriousness of different kinds of wrongful conduct and 
that the sophistication of the distinctions they make increases with 
age. One of the first principles of morality that children acquire is the 
idea that it is wrong to hurt others.155 By age three, they understand 
this principle,156 and by age four, they take into account the 
foreseeability of harm.157 As Philip Zalazo and his colleagues put it: 
“substantive concepts of harm and welfare, however acquired, are 
guiding moral judgments by the fourth year of life.”158 
Findings also indicate that “children consider moral 
transgressions resulting in physical harm to be more wrong than 
moral transgressions resulting in property violations.”159 A study by 
Tisak and Turiel indicates that six-year-old children judge physical 
violence as more serious than theft.160 This suggests that children 
have complex intuitions across different domains. Additional evidence 
comes from studies in which children are asked to give examples of 
moral transgressions. Children give physical acts of harm as the most 
common examples.161 Acts of physical aggression are prototypical 
moral violations to children.162 
Research on morality has shown that people cannot always 
articulate the basis for their moral judgments.163 Even adults are, 
broadly, frequently unable to justify why they chose their actions164 
and it would be reasonable to expect children to have similar 
limitations. Nonetheless, research shows that by age seven, children 
can elaborate ideas about injury fairly well, and, when children make 
 
 155. NUCCI, supra note 136, at 86; see also Kagan, supra note 138, at ix, xi. 
 156. Phillip David Zelazo et al., Intention, Act, and Outcome in Behavioral Prediction and 
Moral Judgment, 67 CHILD DEV. 2478, 2479 (1996). 
 157. Sharon A. Nelson-LeGall, Motive-Outcome Matching and Outcome Foreseeability: 
Effects on Attribution of Intentionality and Moral Judgments, 21 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 332, 
336 (1985). 
 158. Zelazo et al., supra note 156, at 2488. 
 159. Marie S. Tisak et al., Preschool Children’s Social Interactions Involving Moral and 
Prudential Transgressions: An Observational Study, 7 EARLY EDUC. & DEV. 137, 139 (1996). 
 160. Tisak & Turiel, supra note 153, at 1036. 
 161. Marie S. Tisak & Jeanne H. Block, Preschool Children’s Evolving Conceptions of 
Badness: A Longitudinal Study, 1 EARLY EDUC. AND DEV. 300, 300 (1990). 
 162. Id. at 305. 
 163. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 42. 
 164. See WILLIAM HIRNSTEIN, BRAIN FICTION: SELF-DECEPTION AND THE RIDDLE OF 
CONFABULATION (2005); Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 163 (concluding that subjects may not be 
able to evaluate the mental processes underlying a response and instead rely on prior 
perceptions of what would be an appropriate explanation). 
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judgments about blame and punishment, their ideas include a 
calculation as to the intention of the person inflicting the injury.165 
This conclusion—that the first moral concept to appear in 
children is that physical aggression is wrong—is relevant to our 
argument. It is likely more than coincidence that this is also the first 
step in our account of the evolutionary origins of intuitive justice. 
In contrast, very young children might not have a firm grasp on 
notions of fairness in exchange or social contracts. Young children 
frequently announce that some outcome is “unfair.” However, this 
often means that the outcome is unfavorable to the speaker, rather 
than violating a social contract or norm.166 Nonetheless, William 
Damon has suggested that young children can show “consistent, 
patterned reasoning” about fair distribution of property, ownership, 
and the like.167 
Scholars have argued that it is not until later in the 
development of a child, perhaps around nine years of age, that adult-
like conceptions of fairness emerge.168 Indeed, Larry Nucci asserts 
that “[t]he great accomplishment of early-childhood moral 
development is the construction of moral action tied to structures of 
‘just’ reciprocity.”169 Tangentially relevant is research showing that 
young children (age five or less) allocate rewards equally, whereas 
older children tend to allocate rewards with a proportionality (equity) 
rule,170 suggesting a developmental trend in issues associated with 
exchange (effort for reward). 
The integration of multiple factors relevant to estimation of 
seriousness also begins early, perhaps around age seven. In a study 
performed by David Elkind and Ruth Dabek, children were divided 
into groups based on age (average ages of the groups were roughly 
five-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and nine).171 The children listened to 
stories about different crimes. The offense described in each story 
 
 165. See Dale T. Miller & C. Douglas McCann, Children’s Reactions to the Perpetrators and 
Victims of Injustices, 50 CHILD DEV. 861, 866 (1979). 
 166. NUCCI, supra note 136, at 86. 
 167. William Damon, Early Conceptions of Positive Justice as Related to the Development of 
Logical Operations, 46 CHILD DEV. 301, 302 (1975). 
 168. Larry Nucci, Because It Is the Right Thing to Do, 45 HUMAN DEV. 125, 128 (2002). Nucci 
claims that at around age six, “children’s moral judgments become regulated by conceptions of 
just reciprocity.” Id. When fairness and reciprocity emerge can be debated, but it looks as though 
it is after intuitions regarding harm emerge. 
 169. NUCCI, supra note 136, at 87. 
 170. See Jay Hook, The Development of Equity and Logico-Mathematical Thinking, 49 CHILD 
DEV. 1035, 1041 (1978); J.G. Hook & Thomas D. Cook, Equity Theory and the Cognitive Ability of 
Children, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 429, 441 (1979). 
 171. David Elkind & Ruth F. Dabek, Personal Injury and Property Damage in the Moral 
Judgments of Children, 48 CHILD DEV. 518, 519 (1977). 
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varied in terms of whether it was intentional or not and whether the 
damage was to a person or to property. The children then assessed 
blame and were asked about punishment. On average, the children 
viewed damage to a person as more serious, and they judged 
intentional damage as more serious than non-intentional damage 
(though this varied by age). Children of all ages viewed intentional 
personal injury as more serious than unintentional property damage. 
Interestingly, the youngest group of children (average age roughly 
five-and-a-half) thought that unintentional personal injury was more 
serious than intentional property damage, suggesting the importance 
of personal injury.172 This pattern was not found in the older children. 
These results are mirrored in later work that suggests that while very 
young children focus on either intention or harm, older children (age 
four and five) use both harm and intention when making decisions 
about punishment.173 Such conclusions strongly imply that children 
have sophisticated views on desert and possess the ability to weigh 
multiple factors by age seven. 
Charles Helwig and Urszula Jasiobedzka obtained similar 
results by having children aged six, eight, and ten evaluate laws that 
were either socially beneficial (such as traffic laws) or unjust (such as 
age discrimination).174 They found that all children, regardless of age, 
considered “the perceived justice of the law, its social beneficial 
purpose, and its potential for infringement on individual freedoms and 
rights.”175 Helwig and Jasiobedzka concluded that “children apply 
moral concepts of harm, rights, and justice to evaluate laws.”176 These 
findings imply that children develop textured views of legal issues by 
around age six. 
c. Judging Blameworthiness with Factors beyond Offense Seriousness 
Children’s intuitions of justice are sophisticated enough to 
include more than just an assessment of the seriousness of the 
wrongful conduct. For example, they will take account of a person’s 
culpable state of mind—whether the violation was intentional or 
accidental—as noted above. They also consider various exculpating or 
 
 172. Id. at 521. There is evidence that even three-year-olds take intentions into account 
when making judgments about actors. See Sharon A. Nelson, Factors Influencing Young 
Children’s Use of Motives and Outcomes as Moral Criteria, 51 CHILD DEV. 823, 828-29 (1980). 
 173. Zalazo et al., supra note 156, at 2478-92. 
 174. See Charles C. Helwig & Urszula Jasiobedzka, The Relation Between Law and Morality: 
Children’s Reasoning about Socially Beneficial and Unjust Laws, 72 CHILD DEV. 1382, 1382 
(2001). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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mitigating circumstances. For example, the punishment judged to be 
appropriate will change depending on the availability of information 
regarding mitigating circumstances (i.e., the offender had a head 
injury), an effect seen in experiments with children as young as seven 
years old.177 Summarizing their findings, Darley and Shultz conclude: 
[R]esults indicated a fairly sophisticated use of a variety of the moral concepts by 
children from 5 years of age. Children revealed evidence of knowing that judgments of 
punishment presupposed judgments of moral responsibility and that moral 
responsibility judgments presuppose causal judgments. They also used information on 
intention and negligence to assign moral responsibility and information on restitution to 
assign punishment.178 
More recently, research on children’s comprehension of 
provoked harm versus unprovoked harm has revealed similar 
nuances. Studies by Judith Smetana, Nicole Campione-Barr, and 
Nicole Yell required children between the ages of six and nine to 
examine pictures that showed provoked and unprovoked 
transgressions involving either physical injury (hitting) or 
psychological harm (teasing).179 The researchers concluded that 
“[c]hildren judged hypothetical moral transgressions to be more 
serious and more deserving of punishment, and they reasoned more 
about concerns with others’ welfare, for [unprovoked] than for 
provoked transgressions and when retaliation involved hitting rather 
than teasing.”180 The researchers also found that “all children judged 
that escalating the retaliatory response by hitting in response to being 
teased . . . was more serious and more deserving of punishment than 
teasing in retaliation for either teasing or hitting,”181 suggesting that 
children’s understanding of morality and punishment includes the 
view that physical injury is most egregious. 
The sense of justice held by young children also incorporates a 
feature present in adult intuitions of justice: the effect of a mistaken 
belief of an offender. When children aged five and seven (but not 
 
 177. See John M. Darley et al., Intentions and Their Contexts in the Moral Judgments of 
Children and Adults, 49 CHILD DEV. 66, 66 (1978) (finding evidence in children as young as six 
that judgments regarding punishment vary depending on relevant circumstances, such as 
provocation); Adrian Furnham & Steven Jones, Children’s Views Regarding Possessions and 
Their Theft, 16 J. MORAL EDUC. 18, 25-27 (1987); see also Cecilia Wainryb, Understanding 
Differences in Moral Judgments: The Role of Informational Assumptions, 62 CHILD DEV. 840, 847 
(1991) (stating that new information can modify judgments of wrongness considerably among 
people aged eleven to twenty-one). 
 178. Darley & Shultz, supra note 143, at 535. 
 179. Judith G. Smetana et al., Children’s Moral and Affective Judgments Regarding 
Provocation and Retaliation, 49 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 209, 216-17 (2003). 
 180. Id. at 209. 
 181. Id. at 223. 
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three182) make judgments regarding blame, they take into account the 
fact that others might have incorrect beliefs.183 Their judgments are 
quite nuanced. If a person’s belief is different than the child’s on 
matters of fact—that is, beliefs concerning what is true (as opposed to 
what is morally right)—then mitigation often is permitted.184 
However, if the different belief relates to what is right and wrong (for 
example, a teacher who thinks it is acceptable to discriminate against 
someone based on gender), then the person’s mistake does not 
exculpate him.185 This implies that children have a sophisticated 
understanding of others’ beliefs and the role they play in the 
commission of moral offenses. Further research demonstrates similar 
results in older children.186 
Smetana and her colleagues summarize this research and 
suggest that 
by 4 years of age, middle-class, primarily European American children, as well as 
African American preschoolers from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, reliably evaluate 
moral transgressions pertaining to physical or psychological harm and fairness as very 
serious, deserving of punishment, generalizably wrong, and wrong regardless of whether 
or not there is a rule or a teacher prohibits the act.187 
In short, even young children seem to have textured and 
specific views regarding deserved punishment, and these views are 
not derived simply from the dictates of authority.188 
 
 182. A vast research enterprise shows that children under four years of age cannot 
understand that others might have beliefs that are wrong or different from their own. That is 
one possible reason for the developmental difference, having nothing to do with a change in 
moral intuitions, but only more general abilities of understanding. See generally SIMON 
BARON-COHEN, MINDBLINDNESS: AN ESSAY ON AUTISM AND THEORY OF MIND (1995); Alan M. 
Leslie, Pretending and Believing: Issues in the Theory of ToMM, 50 COGNITION 211 (1994); Alan 
M. Leslie, Pretense and Representation: The Origins of Theory of Mind, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 412 
(1987). 
 183. Cecilia Wainryb & Sherrie Ford, Young Children’s Evaluations of Acts Based on Beliefs 
Different from Their Own, 44 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 484, 484 (1998). 
 184. Id. at 90-92. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See, e.g., Larry Nucci & Elsa K. Weber, Social Interactions in the Home and the 
Development of Young Children’s Concepts of the Personal, 66 CHILD DEV. 1438, 1445 (1995) 
(“[C]hildren differentiate personal issues from matters of moral or conventional regulation . . . .”); 
Judith G. Smetana, Toddlers’ Social Interactions regarding Moral and Conventional 
Trasngressions, 55 CHILD DEV. 1767, 1774 (1984) (“[T]oddlers initiate responses to moral 
transgressions . . . [and are] more likely to respond to moral than conventional transgressions 
with emotional reactions, physical retaliation, and increasingly with age, statements regarding 
the harm or injury caused.”). 
 187. Smetana et al., supra note 179, at 210 (internal citations omitted). 
 188. See, e.g., Marsha D. Walton & Andrea J. Sedlak, Making Amends: A Grammar-Based 
Analysis of Children’s Social Interaction, 28 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 389 (1982) (suggesting 
sophisticated understanding of transgressions among five-to-ten year olds in classroom settings, 
including implicit knowledge of what others will think relevant to the way in which a 
transgression is construed). 
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3. Cross-Cultural Developmental Studies 
Substantial research demonstrates that the developmental 
sequence for moral reasoning is not unique to the Western world. 
Nucci suggests that “there is considerable cross-cultural evidence that 
children and adults across a wide range of the world’s cultures 
conceptualize prototypical moral issues pertaining to fairness and 
others’ welfare in ways very similar to children and adults in Western 
contexts, and differentiate such issues from prototypical matters of 
convention.”189 In a recent review, Jenny Yau and Judith Smetana 
conclude that despite cultural differences, “[c]hildren as young as 3½ 
to 4 years of age have been found to treat moral transgressions as very 
serious, generalizably wrong, and wrong independent of rules and 
authority sanctions. In contrast, they treat conventional 
transgressions as less serious, contextually relative, and contingent on 
rules and authorities.”190 
This last point, that children believe moral rules to be 
universally applicable, bears expansion. As discussed above,191 
children distinguish between fundamental issues of justice (e.g., the 
belief that wrongdoing should be punished, property should not be 
forcibly taken, and so on) and issues of convention or collateral 
societal issues (e.g., objects over which individuals can be said to have 
a property right). Children acknowledge that conventions could be 
other than as they are and that if another group of people had a 
different convention, it would not be “wrong.”192 
The capacity of children to make this distinction is relevant to 
the frequently cited argument that cultures differ in their morality, 
found in Richard Schweder et al.’s cross-cultural investigation of the 
relative rankings of wrongful acts as judged by Hindu Brahman 
children.193 Of the thirty-nine acts listed, the children judged the 
following as the most serious wrong on the list: “[t]he day after his 
father’s death, the eldest son had a haircut and ate chicken.”194 They 
judged as one of the least serious transgressions—ranked thirty-fifth 
 
 189. NUCCI, supra note 136, at 95-96. 
 190. Jenny Yau & Judith G. Smetana, Conceptions of Moral, Social-Conventional, and 
Personal Events Among Chinese Preschoolers in Hong Kong, 74 CHILD DEV. 647, 647 (2003) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 191. See, e.g., supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text. 
 192. Cf. Leigh A. Shaw & Cecilia Wainryb, The Outsider’s Perspective: Young Adults’ 
Judgments of Social Practices of Other Cultures, 17 BRIT. J. DEV. PSYCHOL. 451 (1999) (reaching 
similar conclusions with a Chinese sample). 
 193. Richard A. Schweder et al., Culture and Moral Development, in THE EMERGENCE OF 
MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 138, at 1, 36-71. 
 194. Id. at 40. 
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of the thirty-nine—the case of a husband who beats a wife because she 
repeatedly goes alone to the movies. These results may appear to 
conflict with the notion of shared intuitions of justice; Western 
children would make no such ranking. However, the rankings must be 
understood in the context of the underlying beliefs held by the raters. 
Because the father’s soul is put in jeopardy by the son’s act, the son’s 
act is judged as a most serious harm. Similarly, the raters’ 
understanding that the wife’s act is a serious breach of a clear 
contractual and social obligation helps explain why the husband’s 
beating of her is not ranked as more wrongful. In short, while 
underlying intuitions regarding principles of justice may be similar, 
different social conventions create different perceptions about the 
wrongfulness of specific conduct.195 As Cecelia Wainryb explains, 
“what appears to be moral variation may be due not to diversity in 
ethical concepts but rather to differences in informational 
assumptions.”196 This point is important when judging the locus of 
genuine variability in beliefs surrounding intuitions of justice. 
D. Summary of Evidence 
Our hypothesis, that shared intuitions of justice derive in large 
measure from the relentless effects of evolutionary processes on 
human brains and consequent sentiments and behavioral 
predispositions, connects at a deep level with modern developments in 
biology and psychology. The hypothesis also appears to explain why 
these intuitions appear to be so stunningly consistent across our 
species, so subtle in their complexities, and so non-randomly focused 
on the harms to which their attention is particularly keen. We have 
not, in this Part, attempted a definitive proof of our hypothesis. 
Instead, we explored three different areas in which the data are 
consistent with our hypothesis: animal studies, brain science, and 
moral development. 
The animal studies suggest that humans are not alone in 
punishing violations of norms of cooperation, reciprocity, and fairness. 
That so many social species exhibit these behaviors, and in such very 
specific ways, suggests that there is an evolutionary and adaptive root 
 
 195. See generally Turiel, Killen & Helwig, supra note 152, passim; Wainryb, supra note 177, 
passim. 
 196. Wainryb, supra note 177, at 849. However, informational assumptions need not be 
determinative. Id.; see also Cecilia Wainryb, Values and Truths: The Making and Judging of 
Moral Decisions, in RIGHTS AND WRONGS: HOW CHILDREN EVALUATE THE WORLD, NEW 
DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT 33, 33-46 (Marta Laupa ed., 2000) (arguing that the same 
underlying moral values in adults and children, or adults in different cultures, can lead to 
differing views on what is an immoral act because of different information about relevant facts). 
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to these behavioral predispositions. This, in turn, suggests that 
similar human behavior may stem from the same root. The data 
further suggest that indifference to wrongdoing may in many species 
be evolutionarily unstable. And this, in turn, suggests that intuitions 
about punishment may frequently facilitate certain kinds of 
cooperation, such as social exchange. Such intuitions require an 
ability to perceive wrongful behavior, to remember transgressors, and 
to treat them differently than non-transgressors. We not only see this 
ability in many other social animals, but we also see it specifically in 
contexts of inflictions of physical harm, the taking of resources, and 
the violations of norms of reciprocity. 
From the rapidly expanding field of brain science, we see how 
the combination of evolutionary processes and organismal 
development yields anatomically and functionally specialized human 
brains, which tend to function very similarly in individuals across the 
species. Damage to specific regions can result in dramatic social and 
moral behavioral aberrations, which suggests that those areas of the 
brain are sufficiently specialized to be necessary for social and moral 
activity. Imaging studies reveal widely shared patterns in neural 
activity, consistent with evolutionary hypotheses, when subjects are 
confronted with various moral scenarios. More personal and 
evolutionarily salient scenarios invoke various evolved behavior-
biasing computations to a greater extent than do alternative 
scenarios. Far from responding with generic neural activity, human 
brains are intriguingly similar and differentially focused when 
considering such things as bodily injury and violations of cooperation 
norms. This evidence suggests that human brains have evolved the 
specific capacity to process these kinds of transgressions in species-
typical, characteristic ways. 
In the child development literature, experimental evidence 
demonstrates that children understand that some acts are wrong and 
deserve punishment at a very early age. Indeed, the intuition appears 
to exist when children first are able to communicate these types of 
ideas. The notion of physical injury as a wrong is among the first 
elements to emerge in children, followed soon after by notions of 
fairness and reciprocity. These intuitions become increasingly 
textured as children grow older and change from simplistic notions of 
strict equality to more sophisticated notions such as equity, which 
take into account a person’s capacities, contributions, and needs. Most 
strikingly, growing evidence suggests that the development of these 
rather sophisticated intuitions follow similar patterns cross-culturally, 
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though of course there remains important debate about the extent of 
cross-cultural developmental similarities.197 
While no single study or field of research conclusively proves 
our evolutionary hypothesis for the origins of shared intuitions of 
justice, the triangulation of the theoretical foundations from biology 
and psychology generally, alongside behavioral data in humans and 
other species, recent studies of human brain operations, and broad 
research into the characteristically human development of moral 
psychology, presents a strong case. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: GENERAL SOCIAL LEARNING AND 
EFFICIENT NORMS 
Evolutionary explanations inevitably evoke the riposte that 
perhaps the phenomenon in question is simply due to “learning” or 
“culture.” Could the consensus we have documented here be the result 
of social learning rather than evolution?198 Perhaps the norms adopted 
simply reflect a human propensity to copy others’ norms, hence the 
observed consensus without the need for our evolutionary explanation. 
Or, perhaps groups adopt the same norms because the norms are 
efficient for all groups. 
In one sense, the social learning claim—that shared intuitions 
of justice are the product of social learning from the surrounding 
culture—does not conflict with our evolutionary argument in Part II 
because there we suggest that intuitions of justice are indeed 
“learned” in a sense. Babies do not come into the world with intuitions 
of justice intact; rather, they acquire them over time in a predictable 
and largely sequential manner through interaction with their 
environment.199 In this sense, the evolutionary explanation envisions 
some involvement of the surrounding culture, just as the special 
human mechanism for acquiring language involves the surrounding 
culture. 
 
 197. See Schweder et al., supra note 193. 
 198. Of course, any explanation for the very complex features of intuitions of justice must 
include evolution by natural selection as part of their origin, including explanations based upon 
social learning. The ability to learn is itself an evolved trait. See Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 
29, at 119 (discussing the relationship between evolution and learning mechanisms). Thus, an 
argument that groups discover efficient norms regarding justice (see below) requires an 
evolutionary explanation for how the psychological mechanisms that perform this calculation—
whether conscious or unconscious—came to exist. Similarly, an argument that people have a 
predisposition for social learning must also have an evolutionary explanation for this highly 
sophisticated, complex, functional capacity. In short, “learning” and/or “culture” do not obviate 
evolutionary explanations; they necessitate them. 
 199. See supra Part III.C.1. 
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But non-evolutionary explanations go a step further. They 
claim that intuitions of justice result entirely from general social 
learning with no reliance upon an evolutionarily developed special 
mechanism for acquiring intuitions of justice. In other words, the non-
evolutionary explanations claim that people acquire views of justice in 
the same way that they learn most other knowledge or come to most 
other opinions.200 That is, views of justice are learned, reasoned out, or 
chosen through rational decisionmaking. 
A. Spontaneous Social Learning 
One non-evolutionary explanation, which might be called 
“spontaneous social learning,” might proceed as follows: the views of 
justice on which there is so much agreement are those views that are 
most efficient for a group to hold, perhaps because they permit 
productive social cooperation, much like the advantages we discuss in 
the evolutionary account given in Part II. Notably, this explanation 
relies on no special mechanism for the acquisition of intuitions of 
justice. But this explanation for the shared views of justice faces 
several difficulties. 
1. Preferring Group Interests Over Individual Interests 
This explanation depends on the individual’s choice to adopt 
views of justice that are efficient for the group. But there is little 
reason to believe that people are predisposed toward preferring norms 
that are efficient for the group, rather than norms that are efficient for 
their own self interest. To make this explanation plausible, one would 
have to show that people prefer what is good for the group over what 
is good for themselves, a preference that the available data do not 
 
 200. The distinction we draw here is between an evolved “general” social learning ability, 
which may result in, among many other things, the acquisition of intuitions of justice and an 
evolved mechanism “specific” to acquiring intuitions of justice. We take it as uncontroversial that 
a psychological system that acquires many different kinds of information from the social world—
a general social learning system—is the product of evolution by natural selection. But the 
narrow question is whether the system for acquiring intuitions of justice was designed by natural 
selection for that relatively narrow function, as we argue is the best-reasoned conclusion, or was 
designed to acquire information across a wide range of content domains. Evolutionary 
psychologists refer to this distinction as between “domain specific” and “domain general” mental 
systems. See, e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 29, at 97 (arguing that framing psychological 
issues in terms of how “domain specific” cognitive mechanisms are has been and will continue to 
be productive in psychological research). For a discussion of tests for domain-specificity in the 
context of logical reasoning, see Laurence Fiddick et al., No Interpretation Without 
Representation: The Role of Domain-Specific Representations in the Wason Selection Task, 77 
COGNITION 1, 2 (2002). 
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support.201 Instead, evidence from both the laboratory and the real 
world support the view that when group interests are pitted against 
self interest, what has been referred to as “social dilemmas,” it is more 
likely that self interest will prevail.202 Acts of littering, pollution, over-
fishing, and limitless other examples are all cases in which people 
choose to accommodate their own interests over those of the group.203 
In the lab, the question of self-interest-versus-group-interest 
has been addressed by using “public goods” games or “commons 
dilemma” games. In these games, people are put into groups and given 
an allotment of money. Subjects can keep some or all of the money or 
put some or all of it in a group pot. Money in the group pot is 
multiplied by the experimenter at some rate and subsequently divided 
among all the members of the group. Because money in the pot is 
multiplied and subsequently split among the group members, 
everyone in the group is made best off if everyone contributes all their 
money to the group pot, making the “pie” everyone shares larger. 
However, each person is individually better off by keeping his own 
allotment of money for himself. With a few exceptions,204 when people 
play these games in the same group over time, they keep greater and 
greater amounts of their endowment, reaching nearly purely selfish 
behavior over time.205 In short, when individual selfishness is pitted 
against group interest in the lab, selfishness eventually wins. 
2. Complexity of Determining Efficient Norms as Beyond Individual 
Capacity 
Even if people prefer a norm that is efficient for the group, 
though not necessarily good for them personally, another challenge for 
the spontaneous social learning explanation is that determining an 
efficient norm is an exceedingly complex matter, probably well beyond 
the capacity of an individual. Studies of human cognitive skills 
confirm their limitations. Substantial experimental evidence suggests 
that when people are presented with tasks that require the use of a 
general ability to reason using the rules of formal logic, they typically 
 
 201. DAWKINS, supra note 21 (arguing that genes, rather than whole organisms, are the 
entities on which natural selection acts and so, everything else equal, selection will act to favor 
genes that cause their own replication as opposed to genes that cause individuals or groups or 
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 202. Robyn Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169 (1980). 
 203. SAMUEL S. KOMORITA & CRAIG D. PARKS, SOCIAL DILEMMAS (1996). 
 204. See, e.g., Robert Kurzban et al., Incremental Commitment and Reciprocity in a Real-
Time Public Goods Game, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1662 (2001). 
 205. John Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in HANDBOOK OF 
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do not perform well.206 Even in experiments in which the financial 
stakes are very high, in which one might assume that people would 
have an incentive to reason as logically and carefully as possible, 
behavior deviates substantially from wealth-maximizing rationality.207 
As Herbert Simon put it: “[A]ctual human rationality-striving can at 
best be an extremely crude and simplified approximation to the kind 
of global rationality that is implied . . . by game theoretical models.”208 
These limitations are illustrated vividly in Jared Diamond’s 
recent account of the failure of civilizations.209 In these cases, the 
human inability to foresee the consequences of the way that societies 
organize themselves and to regulate the use of resources played 
crucial roles in their eventual downfall. Among the Mayans and the 
Easter Islanders, for example, the mismanagement of resources, due 
to the inability to foresee how cultural practices would affect long-
term growth and stability, played a central role in the collapse of those 
civilizations.210 This differs little from modern times, in which 
economists reach little consensus on policies that will improve 
economic growth because of the complexity of the system in question 
and the limitation of human cognitive abilities to understand and 
predict complex social systems. Diamond’s analysis in many ways 
continues analyses by economists such as Adam Smith and Friedrich 
Hayek,211 who argued that neither the aggregate decisions of a 
democratic society nor the guiding hand of a dictator (for example, 
among the Mayans) is sufficient.212 
In short, the spontaneous social learning explanation for the 
agreement on views of justice is inconsistent with what is known 
about the limits of human calculation, including the sharp limits on 
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the human cognitive capacity for deduction, the common human 
tendency to rely on simplifying heuristics, and other limitations on 
cognition. In contrast, the evolutionary explanation for intuitions of 
justice that we offer in Part II involves a process that “tests” 
alternative intuitional systems (or any other features of an organism) 
through the sieve of natural selection. The feedback loop on genes 
allows only a narrow range of developmental programs to be selected. 
The spontaneous social learning explanation has no such power. 
B. Accumulated Social Learning 
One might try to save a social learning explanation from this 
last flaw—that it is beyond the cognitive ability of a single individual, 
or a single group—by altering the explanation in one respect. One 
might argue that such efficient norms are not learned spontaneously 
by each person or each group, but are the product of accumulated 
social learning across several generations. That is, groups may move 
toward efficient norms over many generations and may perpetuate 
those norms because they are efficient and lead to success. 
In a sense, this argument borrows the refinement mechanism 
of evolutionary theory and makes it available to the general social 
learning explanation. In other words, the claim is that groups with 
efficient norms grow, do better, and spread their norms, and thus over 
time there comes to be a great deal of agreement because of the 
diffusion of the efficient norms.213 The explanation is “evolutionary” in 
that it involves change over time, with less successful norms losing out 
to more successful ones. However, it differs from the evolutionary 
explanation in Part II, of course, because here the selection occurs 
through the operation of social learning, rather than through gene 
selection.214 But this revised social learning explanation, which might 
be called “accumulated social learning,” still faces serious difficulties. 
 
 213. This type of view has its historical roots in the writings of anthropologists who 
developed ideas surrounding “functionalism,” the notion that societal institutions keep the 
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1. Absence of Variation in Intuitions of Justice Among Groups Despite 
Large Differences in Situation and Culture 
There exist vast differences in ecology, history, demographics, 
social structure, and many other variables from one group and culture 
to another. These differences are so striking and of such a nature that 
it seems odd that all groups would find the same norms to be the most 
efficient and, further, that each group would be equally effective in 
teaching these norms to each successive generation. It would be 
surprising if dramatic differences in social structure and social 
resources had no effect on how, when, and what a generation would 
learn about justice from each previous generation. One would expect 
some groups to be better than others at approximating the efficient 
norm and some groups to be better than others at teaching that 
approximation to the succeeding generation. 
Yet, as we documented in Part I, there is a consensus on the 
core intuitions of justice even across demographics and cultures. How 
could one explain this consensus if those views simply reflect the 
efficient norm for each group? This seems a difficult task. It would 
require finding a set of conditions that are universal to all human 
groups, no matter their circumstances and culture, and showing that 
it is these universal conditions alone that set the efficient norms for 
the group’s views of justice. If any factor, other than these universal 
conditions, had influence in shaping the core views of justice, then one 
would find differences between groups according to the differences of 
these non-universal factors. Perhaps others will take up this 
challenge—finding these universal conditions and showing how these 
alone determine core views of justice—but until such can be found, or 
even imagined, it would seem to make the spontaneous social learning 
explanation implausible. In contrast, the evolutionary explanation 
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suffers no such problem. Evolutionary explanations, dependent as 
they are on evolutionarily evolved mechanisms that all humans share, 
fit naturally with human universals.215 
2. Inconsistency with Developmental Data 
Even more problematic for the accumulated social learning 
explanation is that it simply does not fit the developmental data 
summarized in Part III.C. For example, we know that children’s views 
of morality emerge early and are nuanced from a young age. Recall 
that even very young children—around three years of age—are 
precocious universal moralists, believing that certain offenses are 
wrong, even if there were no rule about the act, and distinguish moral 
rules from rules of convention. In particular, children believe that 
unprovoked physical harm is wrong and, further, very young children 
distinguish among offenses (harm versus theft) and take intent and 
extenuating circumstances into account in evaluating 
blameworthiness for violations, suggesting nuanced views of justice.216 
If views of justice were the result of social learning, one would 
expect that young children would have to be taught distinctions such 
as those between precautionary rules and moral rules.217 But it seems 
implausible that these abstractions could be taught to such young 
children, who appear to come to these important distinctions 
precociously.218 The development of these intuitions seems to parallel 
more closely, for example, the growth of teeth than learning to play 
chess. Like teeth, these intuitions simply develop according to a pre-
programmed timetable for all children, as opposed to chess, which 
must be taught systematically and over time with explicit instruction. 
Indeed, chess has a small number of rules, as compared to the 
intricacies of moral judgment, and yet the learning of morality, 
somewhat paradoxically, seems to come much more easily and 
naturally to children than learning chess. 
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It is of course not impossible that children’s ideas about wrongs 
and punishment are transmitted to them by parents and peers while 
they are young. It is significant, however, that these intuitions come 
online across children in a reliably developing sequence at roughly the 
same time throughout the world, without differences reflecting the 
varied practical, social, and cultural conditions. That suggests these 
intuitions are part of a specific, developed learning mechanism, rather 
than the result of general social learning, which is necessarily 
dependent upon the child’s environment, which in turn differs 
substantially from place to place. 
3. Intuitional Knowledge as Having Distinct Characteristics from 
Learned Knowledge 
Even if the social learning explanation were consistent with 
the developmental data, it nonetheless would be problematic. It is 
inconsistent with what we know about the nature of views of justice: 
their intuitional nature. If views of justice were learned from others, 
one would expect such views to have the character of other learned 
knowledge. That is, a social learning explanation assumes that our 
judgments about justice are like many other judgments that we make 
in our daily lives, such as how fast to drive on a stretch of road, how 
long to cook a sandwich in the microwave, or how carefully to take 
notes on a lecture. These judgments, we assume, are the product of 
reasoning, promoted by life experience and education. 
But social science evidence suggests that judgments about 
justice, especially for violations that might be called the core of 
criminal wrongdoing, are more the product of intuition than 
reasoning. Their intuitional nature means, among other things, that 
they are judgments quickly arrived at (even by people with little 
education or life experience), that they frequently are held with strong 
feelings of certainty, and that the reasons we hold such judgments are 
generally not consciously accessible to us. 
In Jon Haidt’s work on “moral dumbfounding,” for example, 
people report strong intuitions about things that are morally wrong, 
such as consensual, non-reproductive incest, but are unable to provide 
a principled explanation for their judgments.219 Similarly, Marc 
Hauser, Liane Young, and Fiery Cushman looked at judgments of 
morally permissible actions using the trolley problem,220 in which a 
certain number of people can be saved from being killed by a runaway 
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trolley if some action is taken (or not taken), resulting in the death of 
a smaller number of people, often a single individual. People are asked 
what choice should be made in these difficult situations and to explain 
their reasoning. While subjects commonly have strong and clear views 
on the proper result, they also commonly are unable to offer an 
explanation for their conclusions. For example, in one variation of the 
trolley problem, the subject can avoid the death of five people on the 
track by (a) pushing a bystander on the track whose body and 
backpack will jam the trolley’s wheels, stopping it, or (b) throwing a 
switch to divert the trolley to a side track where it will kill one person. 
Despite the fact that the results of the two actions are identical, 
eighty-nine percent of the subjects considered the latter action moral 
but only eleven percent judged the former to be moral. More 
interesting for our purposes, seventy percent of the subjects could give 
no plausible explanation for their judgment.221 This mirrors Haidt’s 
results concerning incest. 
There is at least some degree of consensus that many moral 
judgments are made by a deeply intuitive system. Based on his review 
of the existing social science literature, Haidt concluded that “moral 
judgments” derive from “quick automatic evaluations (intuitions).”222 
Similarly, Hauser concludes that “much of our knowledge of  
morality is . . . intuitive, based on unconscious and inaccessible 
principles. . . .”223 If such judgments were the product of a set of 
principles of morality learned from others, it would be a 
straightforward matter to derive the “wrongness” of acts from these 
principles, just as mathematical inferences can be made from a set of 
axioms and subsequently explained by reference to them. “Moral 
dumbfounding” and related effects in the psychological literature 
suggest that this is not how these judgments are made. 
4. Difficulties in Teaching Inarticulable Lessons 
Further undermining the social learning explanation for 
shared views of justice is the fact that, to the extent that people are 
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at explanation rather than reporting reasoning they used in reaching their conclusion. Id. 
(manuscript at 19). The authors used what they called an “extremely liberal criterion”: “A 
sufficient justification was one that correctly identified any factual difference between the two 
scenarios and claimed the difference to be the basis of moral judgment.” Id. 
 222. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 42, at 814, 819-20 
(discussing the automaticity of such judgments). 
 223. HAUSER, supra note 45, at 125. For a recent review of relevant literature, see Cass R. 
Sunnstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531, 531-42 (2005). 
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unable to articulate the principles that underlie their intuitions of 
justice, it is difficult to transmit those principles verbally to others. In 
other words, the intuitional nature of judgments about justice 
undermines the argument that they are socially learned through 
language. Of course, learning through non-linguistic means is 
possible, but the social transmission of information is vastly more 
difficult without natural language. The psychological literature is 
replete with examples of this general principle,224 but the general idea 
is well illustrated by two relevant phenomena. 
First, consider that social transmission is rare in non-humans, 
restricted to narrow domains such as song-learning in birds. Without 
language, non-human animals are confined to very modest social 
learning, so much so that each case of social learning is considered 
extraordinary.225 Second, consider some vivid examples from everyday 
life. The game of “charades” is fun precisely because, deprived of 
natural language, conveying simple ideas, even individual words, is 
difficult. Similar examples include the difficulty in understanding 
what pre-linguistic infants are trying to communicate and asking even 
rudimentary questions of someone with whom one does not share a 
common language. Social learning without language is not impossible, 
but it is certainly difficult. If individual words and simple questions 
pose a challenge, consider how much more difficult it would be to 
convey abstract, complex notions of deontic principles non-
linguistically. If people do not have explicit access to these principles, 
it is unlikely that they are socially transmitted. 
In addition to these many failings of the accumulated social 
learning explanation, recall that it also suffers the objection raised 
with regard to the original “spontaneous social learning” explanation: 
that such an explanation depends upon individuals putting group 
interests above their individual interests. As noted above, the 
available evidence suggests that such altruism has serious limits. 
Until it can be shown that there are special circumstances and 
reasons that prompt such altruistic behavior, the accumulated social 
 
 224. For a recent example, see Bjørn Sætrevik et al., The Utility of Implicit Learning in the 
Teaching of Rules, 16 LEARNING & INSTRUCTION 363, 363, 372-73 (2006) (showing that in 
teaching rules about chemistry to students, “learning was much more effective when more 
explicit ways of teaching were employed”). 
 225. See Michael Tomasello, Culture and Cognitive Development, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 37 (2000) (discussing the human adaptation for cultural transmission of 
information, contrasting it with non-humans’ capacities, in particular non-human primates); see 
also Bennett G. Galef, Jr., The Question of Animal Culture, 3 HUM. NATURE 157, 162 (1992) 
(arguing that non-human animals do not imitate one another in a way that closely parallels 
human imitation, looking in detail at two of the most prominent cases of putative non-human 
cultural transmission). 
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learning explanation is on this ground as implausible as the 
spontaneous social learning explanation. 
CONCLUSION 
On present evidence, we believe that the explanation for the 
“puzzle” of the existence of shared intuitions of justice is more likely a 
specific evolved human mechanism for acquiring these core intuitions 
than general social learning derived from some set of conditions and 
life experiences universal to all humans and all human groups. The 
latter cannot be ruled out on present evidence, but it seems 
implausible, while the former is consistent with all available data. 
Whichever conclusion one prefers, important implications 
follow. Shared intuitions of justice are not easily altered, regardless of 
their source. Even if the source is general social learning, it must be 
social learning arising only from an aspect of human life experience 
that is so fundamental as to be essentially universal to all persons 
without regard to circumstances or culture. In other words, it is not a 
source that is open to easy change or manipulation. If it were not so 
fixed, if it were easily manipulable, then the natural variations in 
circumstance and culture would have altered it and produced 
variations in intuitions of justice; there would not be the agreement 
that exists. 
While a full account of these implications is another project,226 
consider the possibilities. For example, it may be unrealistic to expect 
the population to “rise above” its desire to punish wrongdoers and to 
expect the government to “re-educate” people away from their interest 
in punishing wrongdoers, as is urged by some reformers. It is unlikely 
that the shared intuition that serious wrongdoing should be punished 
can be changed through social engineering, at least not through 
methods short of the kind of coercive indoctrination that liberal 
democracies find unacceptable. 
For another example, a criminal justice system that regularly 
fails to do justice or that regularly does injustice, as judged by shared 
intuitions of justice, will risk a great deal. It will inevitably be seen as 
failing in a mission thought important, even foundational, by the 
community—unless the system can hide its unjust operation. That 
would be hard to accomplish without breaching notions of press 
 
 226. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley., Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal 
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (focusing on common intuitions of 
justice and injustice and examining their implications on the efficacy of criminal systems and 
reform movements). 
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freedom and government transparency to which liberal democracies 
aspire. 
As a final example, any realistic criminal justice system or 
program for its reform must acknowledge and engage the community’s 
shared intuitions of justice. This does not mean that law can never 
deviate from those intuitions or try to change them. There is nothing 
sacred or immutable about our current intuitions of justice. But a 
criminal justice system must be realistic about how different kinds of 
changes may require different—and sometimes high—financial and 
social costs. The greatest success in shaping the perceived 
wrongfulness of particular conduct might not be to fight people’s 
intuitions of justice, but to try to harness them, by providing 
information or arguments that strengthen (or weaken) the analogy 
between the target conduct and the core wrongdoing on which people 
have strong intuitions. 
 
